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In this thesis, I study the problem of implementing a distributed access control
solution on an embedded device. As an example I will have a parking service,
which employs cheap embedded devices at every parking lot to guard them against
unauthorized usage.
I implemented a prototype using SPKI Authorization certiﬁcate based access con-
trol system on an embedded platform. It uses a smartphone as the Client device
and Bluetooth Low Energy as the wireless communication link between the Client
and the embedded platform.
To better evaluate the performance achievable on embedded devices, the system
was implemented on two diﬀerent platforms. Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction and
compressed public keys were also studied as ways to improve the system's perfor-
mance.
The results show that in our use case, the faster platform can evaluate access
permissions within 1.3 s from Client device starting device discovery and the slower
one within 3.2 s. Chain Reduction was found to give signiﬁcant beneﬁts, decreasing
time required for evaluation by over 40%, to 0.8 s on faster platform, while using
compressed public keys only reduced time required by 10% on it. However, both
numbers are dependent on the embedded and wireless platforms used. The faster
platform has good performance in our use case and the cheapness of embedded
devices enables their liberal use in distributed environments.
In conclusion, I ﬁnd that SPKI Authorization certiﬁcates work well as a basis
for a distributed access control system, and that modern embedded devices are
fast enough to provide more than suﬃcient service level even if the cryptography
is implemented entirely with software. One potential application area for this
technology are Internet-of-Things devices, which would beneﬁt greatly from a
distributed access control system.
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Tässä diplomityössä tutkin hajautetun pääsynhallinnan toteuttamista sulaute-
tuissa järjestelmissä. Esimerkkinä käytän pysäköintipalvelua, joka hyödyntää
edullisia sulautettuja laitteita palvelun hallitsemien pysäköintialueiden luvat-
toman käytön estämiseen.
Mittauksia varten toteutin prototyypin SPKI-valtuutussertiﬁkaatteihin perustu-
vasta pääsynhallintajärjestelmästä käyttäen sulautettua alustaa. Järjestelmän
asiakaslaitteena on älypuhelin, ja langaton tiedonsiirtoyhteys asiakaslaitteen ja
sulautetun alustan välillä on toteutettu Bluetooth Low Energyllä.
Järjestelmä toteuttiin kahta eri alustaa käyttäen, jotta voitiin paremmin tutkia su-
lautetuilla laitteilla saavutettavissa olevaa suorituskykyä. Ketjureduktiota ja julk-
isten avainten pakkausta tutkittiin mahdollisina keinoina parantaa järjestelmän
suorituskykyä.
Tulokset osoittavat, että esimerkissämme nopeampi alusta kykenee tarkastamaan
pääsyoikeudet 1.3 sekunnin kuluessa siitä, kun asiakaslaite aloittaa Bluetooth Low
Energy -laitteiden löytämisen. Hitaampi alusta kykenee samaan 3.2 sekunnissa.
Ketjureduktiolla saavutettiin merkittäviä etuja: tarkastukseen kulunut aika lyheni
40%, 0.8 sekuntiin nopeammalla alustalla.
Pakattujen julkisten avainten käyttö taas lyhensi aikaa vain kymmenellä prosen-
tilla. Molemmat tulokset kuitenkin riippuvat käytettävissä olevista sulautetuista-
ja tiedonsiirtoalustoista.
Yhteenvetona totean, että SPKI-valtuutussertiﬁkaatit sopivat hyvin hajautetun
pääsynhallintajärjestelmän perustaksi, ja nykyaikaisten sulautettujen laitteiden
nopeus mahdollistaa riittävän palvelutason myös silloin, kun salaustekniikka to-
teutetaan kokonaan ohjelmistolla. Tämän teknologian yksi mahdollinen sovel-
luskohde ovat "esineiden internetiin" kytkeytyvät laitteet, jotka hyötyisivät su-
uresti hajautetusta pääsynhallinnasta.
Avainsanat: Sulautetut järjestelmät, Elliptisten käyrien kryptosysteemit, SPKI
sertiﬁkaatit, Pääsynhallinta, Hajautetut järjestelmät
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1 Introduction
This thesis studies the problem of implementing an access control solution for a
parking service and the performance attainable by using embedded systems in its
implementation.
In the introduction section, I ﬁrst go through the use case for the parking service
and detail the business requirements arising from it. Next, I present the scope of the
system implementation, and introduce the research questions, which concentrate on
the performance of the system. Finally, the structure of the thesis is detailed.
1.1 Use case
Smart Parking for Intelligent Real Estate (SPIRE) [11] project has created a ﬂexible
parking service called EnterLot. It provides users with information about available
parking spaces and their costs, guides the users to the chosen parking lot with turn-
by-turn navigation, and also provides indoor guidance to the ﬁnal destination inside
the building.
In order to provide a complete solution to parking, EnterLot also requires an
access control solution for the parking lots. In this thesis, a proof-of-concept key-
less, wireless access control system usable by a smartphone was implemented and
evaluated. Main components of the system are the Client and the Barrier, as shown
in the Figure 1
Client:  
A smartphone, inside the 
car of the user. 
Barrier:  
A embedded device that 
controls the security 
gate 
Wireless communication 
Figure 1: Overview of the components of the Access control system
Our use case starts with a driver driving to the entrance of the parking lot, for
which they have a valid monthly parking permit.
2The entrance to the parking lot is restricted by a gate and the embedded system
controlling the gate is called the Barrier.
At the entrance the software running on driver's smartphone (henceforth referred
as the Client) will automatically attempt to wirelessly negotiate with the Barrier
access to the parking lot, without requiring any user intervention in our use case as
the software already knows what parking lot the driver wishes to park at. If the
driver has a valid parking permit, the Barrier will open the gate, allowing driver
to proceed to the area. If not, the Client will show an error message to the driver,
explaining the reason for the access being denied.
The process, starting with the Client initiating communications with Barrier,
and ending with the Barrier having decided to grant access to the parking lot, will
henceforth be called the transaction. From the driver's point of view, the transaction
starts when he or she drives the car to the gate and ends when the gate starts to
rise.
As parking lots are often situated in areas without constant network connectivity,
our use case is built on the assumption that the system does not require a network
connection during the transaction, and certiﬁcates will be used to enable oine use.
Our business requirements can be derived from the EnterLot system and the use
case above, and in condensed form they are as follows:
Business Requirement 1. System will be distributed: system has to support mul-
tiple parking areas, each with its own Barrier.
Business Requirement 2. The Barrier must work without requiring constant net-
work connection.
Business Requirement 3. The Barrier will run on an embedded platform.
Business Requirement 4. The Client device will be a smartphone.
Business Requirement 5. The user shouldn't be required to open the window
and place the phone near the Barrier: in other words, a range of several meters is
required.
Business Requirement 6. To ensure a smooth user experience, the system has
to respond in timely manner: the whole transaction, from requesting access to the
parking lot to the access being granted, should take at most 1.5 seconds, preferably
less than 1 second.
1.2 Scope
The goal of this project was to study the problem of implementing a distributed
access control solution on embedded platform. I therefore implemented a prototype
where the Barrier is an embedded device, the Client is a smartphone and SPKI
authorization certiﬁcates were used as the access control mechanic.
Main focus of the project was on establishing baseline performance for the em-
bedded platform, so particular attention was given to those parts of the system. For
3example, the Barrier was implemented with two separate embedded platforms so
that the diﬀerent performance aspects could be more easily evaluated.
However, as modern smartphones are signiﬁcantly faster than embedded devices,
I chose not to implement a fully functional Client software with the assumption
that it will not aﬀect the performance measurements of the embedded system to
any signiﬁcant degree. In the Analysis section (Chapter 6) of this thesis I will show
that smartphone does indeed have ample time to do any computational operations
required from it and the assumption is, therefore, valid.
1.3 Research questions
In this thesis the main focus is the performance of the access control solution:
Research question 1. What kind of performance for a complete transaction can
be achieved with our chosen embedded platforms?
Research question 2. How is the time taken by the transaction divided between
diﬀerent tasks?
Research question 3. What is the relative resource expense between diﬀerent com-
putational tasks, for example signature veriﬁcation, hashing and parsing?
There are also two potential performance improving techniques which I evaluate:
Research question 4. What kind of performance beneﬁts can be gained by using
Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction?
Research question 5. Elliptic Curve Cryptography allows public keys to be com-
pressed to almost half their original size: in what cases do compressed keys boost
performance, and what are the advantages and disadvantages of using compressed
keys in our system?
1.4 Structure of the work
This work is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a brief background about
access control, cryptography and the technology platforms used in this thesis. Then
Chapter 3 presents the key architecture choices and Chapter 4 provides a detailed
system description. Chapter 5 presents the measurement results obtained from the
system, and said results are then analysed in more detail in Chapter 6. Discussion
and future work are presented in Chapters 7 and 8. Finally, I present my conclusions
in Chapter 9.
42 Background
In this section I present the ﬁve areas related to this thesis. The ﬁrst topic is
Access Control, a process of restricting the usage of resources. The second topic
is public key cryptography, concentrating especially on the use of digital signatures
and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). The third topic is Simple
Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) and how SPKI Certiﬁcates can be used for Access
Control. The fourth topic is Embedded Systems, presenting a short overview on the
broad performance range of diﬀerent microcontrollers. The ﬁnal topic is Bluetooth
Low Energy, which is the technology chosen as the wireless communication platform
of the system.
2.1 Access Control
Access control is a way to secure the resources we want to protect from unauthorized
use. Authorized users are granted rights to use the resources. Typical example of a
physical access control solution is having a lock on your front door, protecting your
home, only allowing people with a proper key to enter. The act of giving the key is
then equivalent to granting the right to access your home.
The process of access control can be split into 4 phases as shown on the ﬁgure 2
below: [20]
0. Making the decision
1. Expressing 
the decision
(just once)
2. Enforcing 
the decision
(repeatedly)
3. Changing or revoking 
the decision
4. The right expires
Figure 2: Phases of access control [20]
In Phase 0, the issuer, or the party controlling the resource or a right (e.g.
parking service) decides to grant a subject (e.g. the driver) some permission to use
the resource (e.g. the parking lot). In our case, an example would be a company
deciding to grant an employee permission to use the company parking lot for the
current year.
In Phase 1,the issuer creates the right, for example by creating and providing a
certiﬁcate for the user, or in other words, expresses the decision. In our case, right
would granted by the company and would take a form of a certiﬁcate proving that
the user is allowed to access parking lot A.
In Phase 2, an entity protecting or guarding the resource veriﬁes that the right
granted to access it is still valid and that the entity attempting to use the right is the
same entity the right was granted to. In our example, this phase would be performed
by the Barrier. Phase 2, enforcing the decision, can happen multiple times.
5Phase 3, revoking or changing granted rights, is optional. In many cases, being
able to revoke permissions granted earlier is useful: For example, if the user was an
employee and had permission to park at the company parking lot, such a permission
would be revoked if the employee left the company.
Finally, if the right is limited in either its duration or usage, it will expire in
Phase 4 after the speciﬁed time period has elapsed or the uses have run out. In our
case, this would happen in the following January.
There are three diﬀerent ways to organize access control rights distribution dig-
itally, of which examples are shown in Figure 3: the ﬁrst one is to have an access
matrix, where authorized users are rows and resources are columns. Intersecting
cells will then contain the exact rights being granted. While Figure 3 only shows
binary "access granted/denied" data, it would be possible to store very complex
data in the matrix cell. In our example, it would contain the time period when the
parking permit would be valid.
Figure 3: Access matrix, Access Control List and Capabilities
As the number of users and resources grows, it becomes evident that this ap-
proach is ineﬃcient: the matrix grows very quickly to a tremendous size. Yet this
matrix is usually sparse, with most of the cells empty, as typically the majority of
users will only be granted access to a small part of the resources.
Two logical options to ﬁx this problem emerged: Access Control Lists, where
matrix column information is stored separately for each resource, giving us a list of
users allowed to use a given resource and Capabilities, where matrix row information
is stored on an user by user basis, giving each user a list of rights they have, also
known as a capability list. In both cases, there is no need to store information about
empty cells (shown as blanks in Figure 3) which can result in major reduction of
required memory.
An Access Control Lists (ACL) is often stored in the trusted memory of the
resource, as the resource will require access to the list to verify an user's right to
use the resource. An advantage of ACL is that the list is always up to date and it
is easy modify items in it, making revocation instant.
However, there are three main downsides to using an ACL setup: ﬁrst, changes
can only be made when the issuer has access to the list, so if the issuer or the list
6is oine, no changes can be made to it. Second, if there are multiple resources that
have to share same Access Control List, for example several doors of a building,
they must all have a network connection to a server holding a master list that all
changes are made to. While local copies of this master list can be made, there is
still the problem of replicating changes between all the diﬀerent copies of the list
at each resource. Finally, last problem is that if the device responsible for verifying
the right, the Barrier in our use case, has limited memory, the ACL list can grow so
large that it cannot be stored in the device. A good example of this issue would be
electronic locks used in large oﬃce buildings.
Capabilities, on the other hand, can be easily implemented as a system where
each user provides the resource a proof that the user is authorized to use it. This has
the advantage that new capabilities can be created and distributed without propa-
gating this information to each resource separately, unlike ACL-based systems do.
This gives Capabilities based approach a major advantage for distributed systems.
However, if the granted right is given to user to be presented to the resource for
veriﬁcation, it must be protected against possible tampering. There is an inherent
disadvantage with the user presenting the right: while in an ACL setup, removing
a granted right is very easy, a capability-based system requires some method for
revoking granted rights. A typical way is to send a list of revoked capabilities
to each veriﬁer. Before granting access to the resource, the veriﬁer checks if the
presented capability is in the revocation list and denies access in that case.
2.2 Cryptography
Cryptography, and especially digital signatures enabled by asymmetric cryptogra-
phy, also known as public key cryptography, is one of the cornerstones of the modern
digital world.
Public key cryptography is based on two separate keys: a private key and a
public key. The private key is kept secret by the entity creating the key pair, while
the public key can be distributed freely. The private key can be used either to
decrypt a message encrypted with the public key or to create a signature, whereas
the public key can be used to verify a signature, encrypt a message to be decrypted
with private key, or the public key can be used as an identity.
Hash functions are one-way functions which can be used to transform arbitrarily
long data into ﬁxed length output, where even a small change in the input data
will cause large diﬀerence in the output data. A hash function is considered cryp-
tographically secure when it is practically impossible to both calculate an inverse of
the hash function and to generate a message with a given hash (collision).
So the combination of hashing functions and public key cryptography are the
factors that truly make digital signatures possible:
• Only an entity possessing a private key can create a digital signature
• As each document has an unique hash, so will each signature be unique. This
is not necessarily an one-to-one relationship: there are algorithms that provide
multiple valid signatures for a single message.
7• Anyone possessing the public key is able to verify the signature, and as long as
we can identify the owner of the public key, we can identify the entity signing
the message.
Digital signatures enable the creation of digital certiﬁcates (henceforth certiﬁ-
cates), which are ﬁxed form signed electronic documents, commonly used to prove
ownership of public keys or rights. The majority of them work by binding two of
either names, public keys or rights: this leads to three diﬀerent types of certiﬁcates
as shown on the Figure 4: identity certiﬁcates, authorization certiﬁcates and at-
tribute certiﬁcates. These certiﬁcates contain at least the issuer, or the entity whose
signature is used to guarantee the information within and the subject, or the entity
about whom the certiﬁcate provides information.
In the scope of this work, digital signatures are used to fulﬁll two information se-
curity objectives: Authenticity and Data Integrity [26]. In our use case, Authenticity
means that the Barrier can identify the original source of the certiﬁcate(s) sent by
the Client and Data Integrity means that the Barrier can detect if the received data
has been altered. Together, Authentication and Data Integrity allow the Barrier to
verify that the Client requesting access to the parking lot is who he claims to be
and that the certiﬁcates, and thus the permissions granted by them, have not been
forged.
Figure 4: Three main types of certiﬁcates[20]
Identity certiﬁcates use the signature of trusted third party (issuer), usually a
Certiﬁcation Authority, to prove that the public key contained within belongs to a
particular name (subject), which typically is a person's username or real name.
An authorization certiﬁcate binds a granted right to a subject's public key. Be-
cause the authorization certiﬁcate is bound to a public key and not a name, any
8subject wishing to use the right must also provide proof that the public key belongs
to the user, which is easily done by providing a service request signed by the user.
Third certiﬁcate type, attribute certiﬁcate, binds rights to a subject's name which
is basically the same binding as Access Control List does. For the purposes of this
thesis, I will concentrate on the authorization certiﬁcates and will not be discussing
identity or attribute certiﬁcates any further.
2.2.1 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
Invented in 1985 independently by Koblitz [19] and Miller [27], Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography was a new way to implement public key cryptography. Where older asym-
metric cryptography techniques like RSA are based on modulo mathematics [30],
elliptic curve cryptography is based on elliptic curves over ﬁnite ﬁelds.
The main advantage ECC has over older cryptosystems is that ECC scales better
as the required security level increases. As can be seen on Table 1, when symmetric
equivalent encryption key length doubles, ECC key size also doubles, but in RSA
required key size increases exponentially and the cost of cryptographic operations
depend on the key sizes.
ECC also has the pleasing property that all cryptographic operations required for
digital signatures (key generation, signing and veriﬁcation) take roughly the same
amount of time, unlike in RSA, where signature veriﬁcation is much faster than
signing, and key generation is very expensive. An example of this can be seen in
the Table 2, where RSA key generation is 2 magnitudes more costly than signing,
which is again 2 magnitudes more costly than veriﬁcation, in comparison to ECDSA
for which the most expensive operation, veriﬁcation, costs less than 25% more time
than cheapest operation, generating a key pair.
For the ARM Cortex-A8 processor, one can see from Table 2, that for equivalent
security level, ECDSA takes approximately 6 times as long to verify a signature, but
RSA on other hand takes 25 times as long to sign a message. For that processor,
ECDSA is a better choice in systems where there is either a need to create keys
relatively often, or key generation is time critical process, or in cases where there
are less than 25 veriﬁcations per signature generation required. The performance
proﬁle of signing being far more expensive in RSA than veriﬁcation is intended:
relative costs of those two operations can be adjusted via choice of parameters.
Symmetric RSA ECC Time to break in MIPS years
80 1024 160 1012
112 2048 224 1024
128 3072 256 1028
192 7680 384 1047
256 15360 521 1066
Table 1: Key Comparison of Symmetric, RSA, ECC [15]
The elliptic curve public key consists of two numbers, x and y. One interesting
phenomenon caused by the properties of elliptic curves is that for any valid public
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Relative cost to
generate a key pair
Relative cost to
sign 59 bytes
Relative cost to
verify 59 bytes
ECDSA, 256 bits 0.81 0.85 1.0
RSA, 3072 bits 4100 21 0.17
Table 2: Comparison of relative costs of equal security level RSA vs ECDSA on
ARM Cortex-A8 @ 720 MHz[37]
key with given x, there are only two possible values for y, both of which can be
derived from the value x. Eﬀectively this means that the public key used in ECC
can compressed to almost half of its original size, storing only the ﬁrst number x
and the knowledge which of the two possible numbers y is. For example, 256-bit
ECC public key requires 64 bytes to store and transfer in uncompressed format, but
only 33 (32+1) when using the compact representation as described in "Compact
representation of an elliptic curve point" [17].
Having a smaller key size also helps in cases where there is a limited amount
of memory available, as is the case in embedded systems, and transferring com-
pressed keys requires less bandwidth. The eﬀect of compressing public keys has on
performance (Research Question 5 will be evaluated later in this work.
Elliptic curve domains are deﬁned by a number of parameters. Certain param-
eter combinations are recommended by standardization organizations like National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Standards for Eﬃcient Cryptog-
raphy (SEC). SEC has deﬁned two categories of curves over prime ﬁelds: r curves,
based on veriﬁable random numbers and k curves which are based on Kobliz curves
and are more eﬃciently computable.
In ECDSA, creating a digital signature is based on calculating the hash of the
message to be signed and creating a pair of numbers based on the hash, the private
key of the signee and a random integer k (where k needs to have certain properties).
It is paramount that each signature has an unique k or the private key can be
calculated from the signature [7]. This also means that if one signs the same message
multiple times, each signature will be diﬀerent.
2.3 Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI)
SPKI is a Public Key Infrastructure that has been studied for 20 years, but whose
standardization hasn't yet been ﬁnished[31]. While many aspects of SPKI have
been researched, the studies relevant from our perspective concentrate on managing
the use of authorization certiﬁcates [20], delegation [24, 10] and distributed systems
[6, 21, 38]. A more detailed literate study is presented in the paper "Survey of
certiﬁcate usage in distributed access control" [23].
There is some research that also evaluates performance [6, 32], the performance
measurements presented in them are done on a PC [6] and might be extending
SPKI with diﬀerent technologies, for example Kerberos [32]. While Burnside et
al. [6] discuss the implications of using authentication with embedded devices, their
choice was to assume that embedded devices would not be able to perform public key
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cryptography in a practical amount of time and to use proxy architecture instead,
whereas the focus of this thesis is to evaluate if modern embedded systems are, in
fact, fast enough to use SPKI.
SPKI focuses on authorization certiﬁcates, in which the resource grants certain
rights to a subject, who in our use case is identiﬁed by a public key. The Subject
then provides this certiﬁcate together with his or her signature to prove that he or
she should have access to the resource.
For the purposes of this work, the contents of an SPKI Authorization certiﬁcate
can be abstracted into a 5-tuple, whose elements are: [9]
1. Issuer: a public key identifying who is granting the permissions.
2. Subject: a public key identifying who is the entity to whom the permissions
are being granted.
3. Delegation: tells if the Subject has the right to delegate the right further (in
other words, issue new certiﬁcates)
4. Authorization: list of permissions given by this certiﬁcate to the Subject.
5. Validity: not-before and not-after dates, specifying the time interval when
certiﬁcate is valid. Both dates are optional; a missing date implies no time
limit in that direction.
This information must then be digitally signed by the issuer so its authenticity and
integrity can be veriﬁed.
The SPKI speciﬁcation draft also presents mechanisms for having certiﬁcates that
are validated online. They could be used for example on usage based billing, where
the user purchases permission to park for 100 hours at a parking lot. In our case,
the permits are valid for deﬁned periods of time and so further discussion of online
validation mechanisms is considered to be beyond the scope of this work. Similarly,
though Certiﬁcate Revocation is an important part of any certiﬁcate infrastructure,
it is also considered beyond the scope of this work.
Delegation is a very important feature in SPKI Authorization certiﬁcates, as the
user does not have to ask authorization directly from the resource or central entity.
The right can be obtained from any entity that has been granted both the right and
the ability to delegate it, resulting in a chain of certiﬁcates used to prove that the
right has been granted to the end user.
An example of chain of trust can be seen in the ﬁgure 5, where a resource issues
a Certiﬁcate for the resource owner, giving full permissions and delegation rights
to the resource owner. The resource owner can then delegate a portion (or all) of
these rights down to Service Provider via a certiﬁcate, Service Provider can then
delegate these rights further downstream by granting a certiﬁcate to a reseller, who
can grant a certiﬁcate to a Sales Point, which will be the entity issuing a certiﬁcate
for our driver. Driver can present this certiﬁcate chain as a proof of the parking
permission.
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Service Provider 
Reseller 
Sales Point 
(propagate) 
(tag (*)) 
(propagate) 
(tag (parking(areas (*)))) 
(not-after (2017-12-31_23:59:59)) 
(propagate) 
(tag (parking(areas(A,B,C)))) 
(not-after (2016-12-31_23:59:59)) 
(propagate) 
(tag (parking(areas(A,B)))) 
(not-after (2016-12-31_23:59:59)) 
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Reductions 
shorten 
the chain 
Service 
request 
Figure 5: Chain of Trust
[22]
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2.3.1 Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction
There are inherent disadvantages in using long certiﬁcate chains presented in the
previous section: every time the right is to be used, the resource must validate
each and every certiﬁcate in the chain separately again, even if the permission itself
remains the same for multiple uses. For the user there is also a privacy issue: a long
certiﬁcate chain reveals details about the user.
Of these two, the former is the far more important aspect in the scope of this
work. For each certiﬁcate in the chain, a digital signature must be veriﬁed, and this
process has a cost in computational resources. This poses a challenge for embedded
systems that often constrained resources, as described later. For embedded systems,
there is also a secondary consideration regarding the memory use of storing long
certiﬁcate chains.
In Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction, the certiﬁcate subject presents the certiﬁcate
chain and requests a new certiﬁcate from an upstream issuer. For example, instead of
having a certiﬁcate chain Resource→Administrator→Service Provider→Reseller→
Sales Point→Customer, we can have a chain of Resource→Service Provider→
Customer, where certiﬁcates from Service Provider to Reseller, from Reseller to Sales
point and from Sales Point to Driver are replaced by a new certiﬁcate issued by the
Service Provider to the Customer.
Instead of having the Service Provider requesting Chain Reduction from the Re-
source, the Resource can perform an internal reduction when it receives a certiﬁcate
chain that has the chain of Resource→Administrator→Service Provider present.
The resulting Resource→Service Provider certiﬁcate is stored inside the trusted
memory of the Resource and thus does not require signing, saving resources. As the
Resource has to verify the certiﬁcate chain in any case, these internal reductions can
thus be considered free [22].
Figure 6 depicts an example where a certiﬁcate chain of ﬁve certiﬁcates is reduced
to two, by ﬁrst having the Resource make an internal reduction of the chain to Service
Provider and then having the Customer request a Chain Reduction from the Service
Provider.
The system can also be constructed so that Customer does not have to present
a full certiﬁcate chain to the resource: if the number of certiﬁcates issued directly
by the Resource is small, it is possible to cache them in the trusted memory of the
Resource so that the ﬁrst certiﬁcate in the chain doesn't have to be presented. This
is the underlying assumption in our use case. So, with one of my research questions
concerning the performance advantages of using Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction (Re-
search Question 4), this leads to two use cases: one where the Client provides four
certiﬁcates to the Barrier, and another where only one certiﬁcate is sent.
Another option presented in the SPKI speciﬁcation draft [31] is to have a mech-
anism, where the veriﬁer would be presented with information on where to retrieve
the missing certiﬁcates of the chain, but it is considered beyond the scope of this
work.
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(propagate) 
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Figure 6: Chain reduction
[22]
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2.4 Embedded Systems
One deﬁnition of embedded systems is that "Embedded systems are information
processing systems embedded into enclosing products"[25]. Embedded systems are
often implemented using microcontrollers as their main central processing unit, and
microcontrollers have certain characteristics which make them signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from general purpose personal computers like desktops and laptops. They have three
major advantages: microcontrollers have signiﬁcantly smaller power consumption,
often by multiple orders of magnitude. They are also signiﬁcantly smaller in physical
size as well as signiﬁcantly cheaper. This combination makes embedded systems
typical choices for distributed systems. There are of course trade-oﬀs in performance
which have been made to achieve these advantages. I will use STM32 family of
ARM Cortex-M0 to Cortex-M7 to show the performance characteristics of typical
microcontrollers: [33]
 Constrained CPU resources: microcontrollers are both clocked slower and do
less work per processor cycle than desktop processors. Typical microcontroller
would be able to perform between 30 to 400 DMIPS (Dhrystone Millions of
Instructions Per Second, a unit of computational performance), whereas mod-
ern smartphone would perform between 7 000 to 30 000 and typical modern
desktop processor would perform between 50 000 to 300 000 DMIPS.
 Constrained RAM: microcontroller memory is calculated in Kb, smartphone
and PC memory in Gb. Typical memory amount in microcontrollers ranges
from 4k to 320k. RAM and the memory controllers used in microcontrollers
are also slower than their respective counterparts used in general purpose
computers.
 Constrained storage space, usually Flash. Typical Flash sizes range from 16k
to 2048k. Flash has limited write cycles which mean that it cannot be used
for storing data that changes often.
When implementing software on microcontrollers, one has to take into account at
least the following considerations:
 Microcontrollers are usually programmed via non-interpreted languages like C
and C++, because interpreted languages require a relatively large amount of
resources to process.
 There are signiﬁcantly fewer ready-made libraries available for microcontrollers
than for desktops. Although embedded systems outnumber desktops by a
signiﬁcant margin, the number of people developing software for embedded
systems is signiﬁcantly smaller.
 Even when using manufacturer-provided standard libraries, there usually is a
lesser amount of abstraction layers available for programmers out of the box.
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Usually embedded systems have certain auxiliary functions outside "normal"
CPU computational functions added to them. In many cases they are the main
reason why a microcontroller was chosen as an implementation platform.
Common examples of such functions include General Purpose Input/Output
(GPIO) ports, hardware timers, communication interfaces ranging from Universal
Asynchronous/Synchronous Serial Transports (USART) to Controller Area Network
(CAN) interfaces and Real Time Clocks (RTC). Some even have true cryptographi-
cally secure Random Number Generators (RNG) and hardware accelerated crypto-
graphic sub-processors. [34]
In this thesis I will study the performance of embedded systems (Research Ques-
tion 1). Given how large the spread is in the performance characteristics in embed-
ded systems, using both a low- and a high-end platform will help in evaluating the
practical capabilities of the system. While the time taken for each diﬀerent task will
of course vary between platforms (Research Question 3), I believe that the relative
expense of operations (Research Question 2) will most likely be similar between the
two embedded platforms.
2.5 Bluetooth Low Energy
As will be explained in Section 3.1.2, I chose to use Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
as the wireless communication link platform. Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), also
known as Bluetooth Smart, is a wireless technology operating on the same unlicensed
Industrial, Scientiﬁc and Medical (ISM) 2.4 GHz band as classic Bluetooth and Wi-
Fi. It was ﬁrst introduced by Nokia under name of Wibree and later merged into
Bluetooth Standard in 2010.
While Bluetooth Low Energy is not compatible with classic Bluetooth, Blue-
tooth Low Energy was designed so that the same antenna can be used both for
Bluetooth and BLE transmissions. This design choice means that many modern
chipsets supporting classic Bluetooth also support Bluetooth Low Energy. Reverse,
on other hand, is not true, as classic Bluetooth requires signiﬁcantly more resources
to support it than BLE does. This means that currently Bluetooth devices fall into
three categories: those supporting classic Bluetooth only, those supporting both
classic Bluetooth and Bluetooth Low Energy and those supporting Bluetooth Low
Energy only.
Bluetooth Low Energy is designed entirely from the perspective of low energy
usage. In contrast to classic Bluetooth, which has 79 one MHz wide physical chan-
nels, of which 32 are advertisement channels, Bluetooth Low Energy only has 40 two
MHz wide channels, of which 3 are reserved for advertising and the rest are used to
transfer the main payload [13].
Because classic Bluetooth uses frequency hopping and contains a large amount
of advertising channels, performing device discovery takes a relatively long time. In
the worst case scenario, a classic Bluetooth device can take up to 10.24 seconds [13]
to perform device discovery, though on average the value is around 2 seconds [39].
Bluetooth Low Energy is designed to perform device discovery signiﬁcantly faster,
of which results will be presented later in this work.
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The three advertising channels used by BLE are designed to use parts of the ISM
spectrum not used by the most commonly used Wi-Fi channels 1,6 and 11, as seen
in the ﬁgure 7. The smaller number of advertising channels leads to device discovery
taking less time, and thus using less energy. Advertising channels being situated in
portion of the spectrum with less interference from Wi-Fi also makes it possible to
use less transmitting power than would be required elsewhere in the spectrum.
Figure 7: Bluetooth Low Energy channel mapping. Channels 37,38, and 39 are
advertisement channels, the rest are data channels [16]
2.5.1 Proﬁles
Bluetooth Low Energy uses proﬁles for communicating between BLE devices. For
the purposes of this work, proﬁles can be divided into two categories: Generic
Access Proﬁle (GAP), which is used to control advertising and connections and
Generic Attribute Proﬁle (GATT), which is used for transmitting information after
the connection is established.
Bluetooth speciﬁcation deﬁnes four speciﬁc roles for GAP: Broadcaster, Observer,
Peripheral and Central, but for the purposes of this work only Peripheral and Central
roles are interesting, as Broadcaster is optimized for only transmitting information
and Observer only for receiving, but our application requires two-way transfer. Pe-
ripheral devices are optimized for having only a single connection at a time and are
generally small, low power devices. Central devices, on the other hand, support mul-
tiple connections and a Central device is always the one initiating connection with
a Peripheral device. One device can support multiple roles, but for the purposes of
this thesis the Barrier is a Peripheral device and the Client a Central one.
Advertisements are used to broadcast small amounts of information by a Periph-
eral device to all listening devices, but they are also used to discover or connect to the
Peripheral device. So in our case, the Barrier is the device sending Advertisements
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Peripheral devices use GAP to broadcast advertisement messages on the 3 ad-
vertising channels. Advertising works by having the Peripheral set an advertisement
interval, ranging from 20 ms to 6 s, and having the Peripheral transmit an adver-
tisement packet once per interval. Usable maximum payload for advertisement is 31
bytes: the Central device can request more data via Scan Response request, which
allows another 31 bytes of payload to be broadcast without opening connection, as
shown in the ﬁgure 8.
Figure 8: Bluetooth Low Energy advertising message [36]
Figure 9: Example of communication between Central and Peripheral [36]
To establish a two-way communication, a Central device replies to an Adver-
tisement by sending a connection request to the Peripheral device, after which a
connection is negotiated and established. One of the things that has to be agreed
then is the Connection Interval, which deﬁnes how often the Central device (Client)
tries to connect to the Peripheral one (Barrier). During this time, Connection In-
terval parameter is speciﬁed, though it can be updated at any point later.
After the connection is established, payload data can be sent using GATT, with
a high level example shown on ﬁgure 9. Figure 9 does not show payload at message
level of detail: there can be multiple messages transmitted during single Connection
Interval.
The Bluetooth Low Energy claims to have maximum throughput of 236.7 kbps
[12]), achievable throughput is much lower. Bluetooth 4.1 speciﬁcation states that
the minimum Connection Interval is 7.5 ms, maximum of six messages being sent
per Connection Interval and maximum payload per message being 20 bytes [13],
this leads to maximum theoretical throughput of 128 kbps, though in practice the
amount of messages transmitted in each interval is often dependent on the interval
length and both the minimum interval length and the maximum number of messages
transmitted per interval are device speciﬁc.
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Recently released Bluetooth 4.2 Speciﬁcation deﬁnes a Data Length Extension,
which increases maximum message payload length by a factor of 10 to 200 bytes per
message, though actual throughput is expected to increase only by factor of 2.5 as
less messages can be transmitted per interval when using it [14].
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3 Architecture choices
In this section I discuss the key architecture choices for the implementation. I have
grouped these choices into two categories: platform and architecture. As the choice
of the platform will restrict choices made for the software architecture, I will discuss
the platform aspects ﬁrst.
3.1 Platform
These include my choice of embedded platform used for the Barrier, smartphone
to be the Client and Bluetooth Low Energy as the wireless technology used for
communication.
3.1.1 Embedded platform
I chose to use ST Microelectronic as the embedded device supplier, as their products
were readily available from multiple diﬀerent product categories. To better under-
stand how the performance scales (Research Question 1) I decided to implement the
system on two microcontrollers: one low-end, one high-end. For low-end I chose to
use STM32F051R8T6 ARM R© Core M0 processor running at 48 MHz with 64 kb of
Flash and 8 kb of RAM (38 DMIPS), and for high-end STM32F407VG, 168 MHz
ARM R© Core M4 processor with 1024 kb of Flash and 192 kb of RAM (210 DMIPS)
Both platforms also have certain integrated peripherals, like Real Time Clocks
(RTC) allowing them to keep track of time, multiple Universal Asynchronous/ Syn-
chronous Transmitters (USART) for sending and receiving serial information, Cyclic
Redundancy Check calculators etc.
F4 has a random number generator (RNG) implemented in hardware, allowing
it to be used for secure generation of public/private key pairs and for signing. F0
does not have one, so for cases where random number generation is required I will
be using pseudo-RNG instead. In this implementation, random number generation
is required from the Barrier for sending signed receipts to the Client.
While F4 has practically limitless memory (both Flash and RAM) as far as this
application is concerned, F0 is very constrained in this regard, an issue which had
to be taken into account in the implementation.
Standard libraries provided by ST will be used to provide low-level abstractions
for programming the embedded systems, but while they are abstractions, they are
not high-level abstractions: for example, standard library provided by ST only allows
sending one character at a time via USART; to send complete strings, another
abstraction layer has to be implemented.
Dynamic memory allocation is not used in any software implementation in the
Barrier for three reasons: 1) it can lead to non-deterministic run times 2) it increases
amount of bookkeeping that has to be done 3) dynamic memory allocation opens
up the possibility of memory leaks, which are especially hard to debug in embedded
systems. Barrier also pipelines computational operations so that they can be done
simultaneously while receiving information sent by the Client.
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3.1.2 Wireless communications technology
The candidate wireless technologies for connecting the Client and the Barrier were
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), classic Bluetooth, ANT, Zigbee, Near Field Com-
munication (NFC) and Wi-Fi. I chose Bluetooth Low Energy, as it ﬁlled all of our
requirements, though it does have a slightly low throughput.
Classic Bluetooth would otherwise have been a good candidate, especially consid-
ering the signiﬁcantly higher throughput of 2.1 mbps it possesses. However, classic
Bluetooth has an average pairing time of over 2 seconds [39], which would have made
it impossible to reach our business goal of completing the transaction in less than
1.5 seconds (Business Requirement 6).
Other technologies were discounted for several diﬀerent reasons: Neither ANT
nor Zigbee are integrated in modern smartphones (Business Requirement 3). While
there are phones with integrated NFC, they are relatively rare and NFC range is
only few centimeters (Business Requirement 5). Finally, setting up a Wi-Fi access
point requires more expensive hardware than Bluetooth Low Energy does, obtaining
IP-addresses via DHCP and other relevant procedures to enable communications
can take many seconds and a Wi-Fi setup would also have required more security
infrastructure as Wi-Fi has signiﬁcantly higher range than BLE does: while a range
of up to 10 meters is useful for our case, exceeding that range might become a
liability.
For the Bluetooth Low energy communications chip I chose to use nRF8001,
as it was readily available with manufacturer provided libraries. As the GATT
proﬁle I chose to use a custom UART data transfer proﬁle that was provided by
Nordic Semiconductor. Packet level message acknowledgments were not used as
they would reduce throughput to one third. Nordic Semiconductor had also provided
example code for using the custom UART proﬁle for serial data transfer on Arduino
microcontroller platform.
3.1.3 Modular architecture
USARTSPI
Arduino 
Mega 2560
nRF8001 
BLE module Embedded 
platform
Either SMT32F0
Or STM32F4
Figure 10: Barrier architecture
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To better support using two separate microcontrollers, a modular architecture
was used for the Barrier as shown in the Figure 10. Instead of integrating the
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) chip nFR8001 directly into the embedded device,
I chose to make a separate BLE module in which the nRF8001 is connected to
Arduino Mega 2560 via Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) bus. The BLE module then
communicates with the embedded device in the Computational module via Universal
Synchronous/Asynchronous Serial Transport (USART). This had the added beneﬁt
of not requiring us to port neither the libraries nor the UART-data transfer code to
our embedded devices.
This modular architecture allows us to make changes in either portion of the
Barrier without requiring further changes to the other, isolating the embedded plat-
forms from each other, as long as the interface between the modules stays the same.
This allows for easily changing the embedded device from F4 to F0, or it could
be used to change the communications module to use completely diﬀerent wireless
technology without requiring changes to the embedded system.
3.1.4 Smartphone
Client software running on a smartphone was a business requirement (Business re-
quirement 4). I chose to use LG Nexus 5 running on Android 4.4.4 as it was the
current reference Android design at time the of implementation.
Per our scope (Section 1.2), I concentrate on evaluating the performance aspects
of the Barrier and therefore certain features are not implemented in the Android
application. For example, while the application does receive the nonce from the
barrier, it does not generate or sign the service requests on the ﬂy: instead the Client
sends pre-generated service requests with embedded certiﬁcates, both of which have
been made in advance, with separate PC software and scripts written for this task.
As stated earlier, I believe this will not aﬀect the performance of the system in
any measurable way as modern smartphones are at least a magnitude faster (7000+
DMIPS) than even the fastest embedded platform I used (210 DMPS), so based
on the measurements, it is safe to assume that signing the service request takes
less than 10 ms. Considering that the smartphone has at least 40 milliseconds (2x
advertising interval) of time to do the service request generation and signing, not
implementing these on the Client does not aﬀect the performance measurements of
the Barrier.
Later in the Results section (Section 5.4) I show that the Client has even more
time, on average 230 milliseconds, to perform these operations.
3.2 Software and Architecture
Under this section I will discuss architectural choices regarding software implemen-
tation: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and encoding used for SPKI
Certiﬁcates and service requests.
22
3.2.1 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
Authorization certiﬁcates and the service request have to be digitally signed. I chose
to use Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm instead of RSA, because in typical
cases the resource cost of signing using ECDSA is at least a magnitude cheaper than
signing using RSA [37].
Two main choices regarding ECDSA had to be made at this point: What key
size to use and what parameters we wanted to use for the curve. There is a trade-oﬀ
between increased key size and performance, and using a too large key size would
be detrimental from the performance point of view. NIST recommends using a
minimum key size of 224 bits from year 2014 to 2030 and 256 bits from year 2031
onwards [2]. To test the performance limits of the embedded system, I chose to use
256-bit keys.
Next choice was on what curve to use: Standards for Eﬃcient Cryptography
Group support using both so-called Random and Koblitz curves [8] and I chose
to use secp256k1 (Koblitz) curve, as operations on it are faster to calculate than
operations on secp256r1 (random) curve [4]. The downside of using Koblitz curves
is that they are slightly easier to brute force. However, the eﬀect is small, reducing
the time required by factor of
√
3 [4] and considering the key size we are using this
should be a non-issue.
Implementing Elliptic Curve Cryptography eﬃciently would have been far be-
yond the scope of this work, and thus I decided to use an open source library called
uECC [18] for all ECC functions. uECC has been designed to work with microcon-
trollers and even has assembler optimizations that would work with F0.
uECC requires using 256-bit hashes for signing when using 256-bit key length,
which limited our hashing algorithm choice. This, combined with the need for
security, led me to choose SHA-256 as the hashing algorithm, as it is an industry
standard [2] and its predecessor, SHA-1, has already been deprecated because of
security issues [28].
In Elliptic Curve Cryptography, public keys can be stored and transmitted either
in uncompressed or compressed format. For 256-bit public keys, using compressed
format will save 31 bytes of space for each public key stored or sent [17]. My
implementation uses compressed keys to evaluate their eﬀect on performance.
3.2.2 SPKI Certiﬁcate and service request encoding and speciﬁcations
For all transmissions there needs to be an encoding for the data: a standard on
how the information is represented, agreed by all of the parties participating in the
transmission. For SPKI, two diﬀerent encodings are already deﬁned in literature:
S-expressions [31] and XML-encoding [29].
Both of these are text encodings: in other words, they transfer information only
via "printable" characters, making them human-readable and thus easier to debug.
This has the downside of taking a relatively large amount of space, because text
encoding uses only 7 bits of the 8-bit byte. Space usage is increased even more by
verbose ﬁeld descriptions.
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I chose to use Canonical S-expressions, which are a (proper) subset of S-expres-
sions: the main diﬀerence is that Canonical S-expressions are easier to parse than
"classic" S-expressions as they do not allow white spaces between ﬁelds.
XML-encoding was not chosen as it would have used even more space and XML-
parsers are relatively large and resource intensive: for example, TinyXML2, an open
source XML-parser designed for embedded and other low resource environments, is
around 4500 Lines of Code long, and is not actually even fully featured [35].
To keep the information wholly human readable, all numbers were transmitted
in hexadecimal encoding, which also wastes space: hexadecimal encoding requires
sending 2 bytes to send 1 byte of information.
We could have saved space by using base64, which on average requires sending
4 bytes for each 3 bytes of information sent, but base64 is not as easy to parse for
humans. Also, it is slightly harder to convert numbers to base64 or back, than to
convert numbers to hexadecimal.
If transmission times are found to be a performance bottleneck, it is possible to
create new speciﬁcations and change to using a more dense encoding in the future,
though it might require a signiﬁcant amount of work.
Of course specifying the certiﬁcate encoding is not enough, as it speciﬁes only
how the information is represented, not what information is required. To complete
a transaction, a Client must provide a signed service request with an embedded
certiﬁcate chain to the Barrier. In addition to those, a Barrier must provide a
signed receipt for the Client when the transaction has been completed. This leads
to having to specify four message portions: service request, certiﬁcate, signature
and receipt. Their speciﬁcations for our use case are found in the Appendix A, but
in essence, the message portions store the following information:
A service request contains the following ﬁelds: which parking lot does the user
want to park at (Parking Area ID), who the user is (public key), a cryptographic
nonce to prevent replay attacks, how long the service request is valid, and the length
of the certiﬁcate chain. While certiﬁcates are technically embedded inside the service
request, they are discussed separately.
A certiﬁcate contains the following ﬁelds; who has issued the certiﬁcate (public
key), who is the subject (public key), does the subject of the certiﬁcate have the right
to issue new certiﬁcates (delegation), what parking permissions does this certiﬁcate
grant, and for what time period (from where to where) this certiﬁcate is valid.
A signature contains the following ﬁelds: a hash of the message portion (service
request or certiﬁcate) the signature refers to, who is signing the message portion
(public key), and the hash signed cryptographically by the signee.
A receipt contains the following ﬁelds: a hash of the received service request and
a reason code specifying whether the service request was accepted or denied.
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4 Implementation description
In this section I present a more detailed explanation of the system components,
the Client and the Barrier. Following that, I give a more detailed overview of the
transaction, which starts with the car arriving to the entrance of the parking lot,
and ends with the Barrier granting access to the parking lot. Finally, the internal
workings of the software are discussed, ending with the considerations caused by the
very constrained resources of F0.
4.1 System Components
USARTSPI
Arduino 
Mega 2560
nRF8001 
BLE module Embedded 
Platform
Android Smartphone
LG Nexus 5
Either SMT32F0
Or STM32F4
Figure 11: System architecture
As seen in the Figure 11, the system is split into two main components: the Client
and the Barrier, with the Barrier being further divided into two modules, Bluetooth
Low Energy module and Computational module. The main responsibility of BLE
module is to send Advertisements (containing nonce and Barrier UUID) and to
work as a communications bridge between the Client and Computational module,
which is responsible for all non-BLE related tasks. A more detailed overview of the
component responsibilities is given on Table 3.
To better evaluate the performance of the Barrier, it was implemented with
two diﬀerent computational modules: one built with STM32F0 Discovery Board
(henceforth "F0") and one with STM32F4 Discovery Board (henceforth "F4").
BLE module consists of Adafruit nRF8001 BLE chip connected to Arduino Mega
2560 via SPI bus that is clocked at default rate 4 MHz, allowing transmission speeds
of up to 4 mbps. This interconnection has a far higher speed than the theoretical
1 mbps symbol rate of Bluetooth Low Energy has, meaning it will not slow down
any transfers. Communication with the Client is handled by publishing an UART-
type interface that allows the Client to send and receive messages, each containing
20-byte payload.
There is an another communication bridge inside the Barrier, between BLE
module and Computational module. This one is implemented via standard USART.
This USART bridge does not cause a bottleneck in communications either, as the
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Task Component
Client Barrier
Send advertisements containing nonce and UUID X
Present user an interface to use the system X
Send signed service request with embedded certiﬁcate chain X
Received signed service request X
Check that service request is correct and contains a valid nonce X
Verify integrity and authenticity of the service request/certiﬁcate chain X
Evaluate the certiﬁcate chain X
Allow/Disallow access to the resource X
Send signed receipt to the Client X
Receive receipt X
Table 3: Tasks and the components responsible for them
maximum speed of the USART link between the modules is 1 mbps, signiﬁcantly
higher than the maximum achievable throughput of the BLE link.
4.2 Transaction overview
As stated in Introduction (Chapter 1), our use case starts with the driver arriving
to the entrance of the parking lot. For our purposes, the transaction begins when
the Client initiates device discovery and ends when the Barrier has made a decision
about granting access to the parking lot and signals it to the user by opening the
gate, and/or via traﬃc lights. From the driver's point of view, the transaction is now
complete: even though the Barrier still has to generate, sign and send the receipt
that to the Client, this will be done while the gate opens, before the driver has had
time to enter the parking lot.
I have divided that transaction into following tasks, as shown on the Figure 12:
0. The Barrier sends advertisements with 20 ms interval, repeating until connec-
tion is established.
# Transaction begins
1. The Client initiates device discovery and ﬁnds the Barrier.
2. The Client connects to the Barrier.
3. The Barrier sends an ACK to the Client, signaling that the connection param-
eters have been negotiated.
4. The Client sends a service request with an embedded certiﬁcate chain to the
Barrier.
5. The Barrier starts processing message portions as they arrive, instead of wait-
ing for the Client to ﬁnish transmitting the whole message.
(a) A message portion is parsed, its type recognized and data ﬁelds extracted.
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(b) If the message portion is a signature, it is used to verify the message
portion it refers to.
6. Having received and veriﬁed the ﬁnal signature (for the service request), the
Barrier evaluates the certiﬁcate chain and opens the gate if everything was
correct.
# Transaction ends
7. The Barrier generates, signs and sends the Client a signed receipt.
If at any point there is missing information, or an invalid signature, the Barrier
sends an error message to the Client and aborts the process. Even in this case,
it sends a signed receipt to the Client, after which the Barrier returns to sending
advertisements.
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Figure 12: Transaction Flowchart
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4.2.1 Messages
There are six diﬀerent types of messages used in the system, with diﬀerent functions.
BarrierClient
Message1
Message2
* *
Message 3
Message4
Message 5
Message 6
Message 1: Advertisement
Contains Barrier UUID and Nonce
Message 2: Request to open link
Message 3: 
Negotiate link parameters
Message 4: ACK 
Link established, speed/interval 
and other parameters negotiated 
successfully
Message 5: Service request 
Signed service request with 
embeded certificate chain
Message 6: Signed receipt.
Figure 13: Messages exchanged in the system
Figure 13 shows the messages that are exchanged by the Client and the Barrier.
Content of these messages is detailed below, with messages 1 - 5 being part of the
transaction and message 6 being sent as the gate opens.
Message 1 Advertisement sent periodically (every 20 ms) by the Barrier. Payload
of the advertisement message contains the nonce and UUID of the
Barrier, from which the Client recognizes what parking area the Barrier
belongs to.
Message 2 Request to open link (initiate connection)
Message 3 Actually consists of multiple messages where Client and Barrier nego-
tiate all link parameters, Connection Interval of 7.5 ms being the most
important one from the perspective of this work.
Message 4 The Barrier sends "Acknowledged" message (ACK) when the Connec-
tion Interval has been negotiated to correct level.
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Message 5 consists of actual payload the Client wants to send to the Barrier:
signed service request with an embedded certiﬁcate chain, proving that
the Client both wants, and has right to, access services guarded by the
Barrier.
Message 6 Is a receipt signed by the Barrier, consisting of a hash of the service
request, a reason code for granting or denying access and a signature.
Message 5 is encoded as Canonical S-expression and consists of a signed service
request with an embedded certiﬁcate chain. The certiﬁcate chain consists of signed
certiﬁcate(s). Message 5 is split into following types of message portions: service
request, certiﬁcate(s) and signatures. Both for the service request portion, and for
each certiﬁcate portion, there is a corresponding signature portion.
So the structure of Message 5 is following:
Service request
Certificate 1
Signature 1
...
Certificate N
Signature N
Signature N+1
Altogether there are 2N+2 message portions in the Message 5, where N is the
length of the certiﬁcate chain. In our normal use case, while the system uses 5
certiﬁcates as per Figure 5, the Client only has to present 4 certiﬁcates to the
Barrier or 1 certiﬁcate, if Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction is used.
4.3 Software overview
Creating the software for the microcontroller required writing only slightly over 3000
Lines of Code, as all low-level functions were implemented using standard libraries
provided by ST and only timing, USART and RNG required signiﬁcant extensions
to be written for them. For both SHA-256 and ECC, there were freely available
libraries, either GPL or BSD-licenced. For comparison, these two libraries were
around 200 and 2500 LOC respectively. The author of uECC also provided a C-
program for testing the library, and a modiﬁed version of that was used for running
the cryptography performance tests.
For Bluetooth LE communications, programs or libraries providing basic func-
tionality for USART type data transfers were also available and used: Nordic RF,
the manufacturer of the BLE chip used in our BLE module had ready made libraries
for AVR/Arduino and example code that was modiﬁed to work for our requirements.
Similarly, Android software that had basic UART-BLE transfer functionality was
available on GPL license, and it was used as basis of the Client software in the
system.
I have split the main functions of the Barrier software into following tasks:
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1. Communication: sending and receiving communications via USART
2. Buﬀering: storing received messages into buﬀer for later processing
3. Parsing: extracting relevant information from the messages
4. Cryptography: calculating hashes from incoming messages, decompressing
public keys and verifying signatures.
5. Evaluation: Evaluating certiﬁcate chains
4.3.1 Communication, buﬀering and parsing
Communication was implemented using interrupts for two reasons: ﬁrst, it would
save clock cycles as we wouldn't need to poll USART interface periodically even when
we were not receiving communications and second, it would allow us to implement
better power saving schemes if those would be required in future.
For buﬀering, a classical circular buﬀer was used. For our faster platform, F4,
the buﬀer was 10 message portions long, and thus easily able to store our larger use
case, where certiﬁcate chain was of length 4, completely in the buﬀer. Unfortunately
our slower platform F0 was resource constrained, and the buﬀer had to be reduced
to storing only 4 message portions in it, which meant introducing delays in the
Bluetooth Low Energy module as described later in Section 4.3.4.
To ease parsing, control characters were inserted in the data stream in the Client
code, marking the end of each message portion. After a complete message portion
was received in the data stream, that portion was then stored into the circular buﬀer
for later processing. Each message portion was then parsed as a simple C-string,
using standard C library functions to split the message into tokens, from which
the required data was extracted. As per best practices, functions used for data
extraction are protected against buﬀer overruns, and thus malformed ﬁelds will not
cause writes to wrong memory areas: instead, malformed data ﬁeld will result in
message veriﬁcation failing in a later step.
4.3.2 Veriﬁcation
First step when a certiﬁcate message portion is received, is that a SHA-256 hash is
calculated from it and stored. Because the embedded certiﬁcate chain is considered
to be part of the service request, a separate hash of all received message portions
(excluding ﬁnal signature) is also calculated and is used to verify the service request.
So the veriﬁcation process has 4 steps:
1. Calculate the hash for each received message
2. if the message portion was a service request, evaluate ﬁelds in it to save time
in cases where there is a problem with the service request.
3. Compare the calculated hash against the hash received in the signature mes-
sage portion.
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4. Decompress the public key and verify the signature.
While a hash can be calculated immediately after the message portion has arrived,
comparing it to received hash, decompressing the public key and verifying the sig-
nature can only be done once the signature message portion has been received.
The ﬁelds of the service request can be evaluated immediately after it has been
parsed, as long as its signature is veriﬁed at some point. As evaluation is computa-
tionally cheap compared to verifying a signature, doing evaluation immediately after
receiving the service request portion allows the Barrier to an send error message to
the Client if a problem was detected, without the performance penalty associated
with either verifying the signature or waiting for the signature to arrive.
Service request evaluation consists of the following: service request subject is
the Barrier (i.e., the Barrier was the intended recipient of the service request) and
service request is intended for the parking area that the Barrier is part of (Parking
Area ID matches with the Barrier's). After that the Nonce of the service request
is compared to the one the Barrier expects to receive (Nonce is present to prevent
replay attacks). Finally, the request validity period is compared against Barrier
Real-Time Clock.
The third step, done after receiving the signature message portion, is used to
save time if the message has been corrupted in transmit. In it, a calculated message
portion/complete service request hash is compared against the hash stored in the
signature. This is not a security measure: any corruption in the message would be
detected when verifying the signature in any case, but comparing hashes is at least
5-6 magnitudes faster than verifying a signature is.
In the fourth step, the public key in the signature message portion is decom-
pressed and the signed hash stored in the signature message portion is veriﬁed via
the use of the decompressed public key against the calculated hash of the message.
As stated in an earlier section (Section 3.2.1), an open source library was used for
decompressing public keys, verifying signatures and signing messages. Same library
was also used in the PC application to generate keys and sign messages. uECC [18]
was written so that key generation and signing functions would be resistant to so
called "timing attacks" [5], where time required to perform a cryptographic function
leaks information about the key used in it. uECC also contains optimizations written
in assembler for Arm Cortex-M0, whose performance eﬀectiveness I will evaluate
later in this work.
4.3.3 Evaluation
Finally, after all message portions have been veriﬁed, certiﬁcate chain is evaluated
in the following steps
1. Certiﬁcate chain integrity is checked: subject of certiﬁcate N must be issuer
of Certiﬁcate N-1. The issuer of the ﬁrst certiﬁcate must be a subject of a
certiﬁcate stored in the trusted memory of the Barrier.
2. Intersection of the validity periods is calculated and the result is veriﬁed
against Barrier RTC.
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3. Delegation chain completeness is veriﬁed (all, but ﬁnal certiﬁcate in the chain,
must have delegate bit set to 1)
4. Intersection of the rights for permits speciﬁed in the service request is cal-
culated. If the resultant is not empty set, permissions intersection is then
veriﬁed that the parking lot guarded by the Barrier is included in it and that
the intersection allows parking at the current time, checked against the Barrier
RTC.
4.3.4 F0 considerations
As F0 had signiﬁcantly less processing power and memory than F4, certain adjust-
ments to both Bluetooth transmission and Computational module code had to be
made:
1. Because of constrained RAM, F0 can only process and store certiﬁcate chains
of length 5 or less. The current limit in F4 is 10, but could be increased
trivially to 50 or more.
2. Because of constrained RAM, F0 has a buﬀer size of only 4 message portions.
3. Standard library USART interrupt implementation in F0 was causing excep-
tions if it received transmissions while doing buﬀer operations (copying a mes-
sage portion to or from the buﬀer). To ﬁx this issue, the BLE module was
modiﬁed to add a small 10 ms delay after each message portion was transmit-
ted. This delay was not optimized to be as small as possible.
4. Because of the small buﬀer size and slow processor, using standard transmis-
sion rates would have caused the F0 message buﬀer to overﬂow. To avoid the
overrun, the Bluetooth USART bridge was modiﬁed to change the delay added
in item 3 to 100 ms after 4th message portion was received.
These changes were implemented in a fashion that allows turning them on and oﬀ
easily via conﬁguration parameters.
No changes were required for the Smartphone client to adjust for using F0 in the
computational module.
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5 Results
In this section, I present the performance results of the system. The measurements
are split into four diﬀerent groups:
 Message parsing and certiﬁcate evaluation
 Cryptography, i.e. hashing, decompressing public keys and verifying signatures
 Bluetooth Low Energy transmission times, including device discovery and time
to open connection
 Transaction performance
These in turn can be split into measurements done on F0 and F4. All measurements
were done for both F0 and F4, except for time required to perform Bluetooth service
discovery and opening Bluetooth connection, as neither of those are dependent on
the Computational module.
5.1 Methodology
I used three diﬀerent methods to perform the measurements, using the Client, the
Bluetooth Low Energy module and the Computational module.
The Client was used to measure the following values: Service discovery, opening
connection and total time taken for transaction. The measurements were done using
internal elapsed milliseconds counter. "Device discovery" is the time taken by the
Client from starting to search for Advertisements, to it ﬁrst receiving Advertisement
from the Barrier. "Opening connection" is the time between the end of device
discovery and the Client receiving ﬁrst "Connection OK" message from the Barrier.
The Bluetooth Low Energy module was used to measure the time spent trans-
ferring information, and the measurement was done via the internal interrupt-based
millisecond counter. Time spent transferring information was deﬁned as the time
between receiving ﬁrst payload from the Client and receiving the last one.
The Computational module was used to measure all computational operations,
the generation of signed receipt and the time spent from receiving ﬁrst payload from
the Client via BLE module to the Barrier having completed the evaluation of the
certiﬁcate chain. Transaction length can then be calculated by adding the time
between receiving ﬁrst payload to completing certiﬁcate chain evaluation, to time
taken by "device discovery" and "opening connection".
Timing measurements on the Computational module were measured using the
"Systick" interrupt counter in the micro controller hardware, having the Systick
interrupt launch either every 100 µs (F4) or every ms (F0) and increment a timing
counter. Because of how the "Systick" interrupts are implemented [34], increasing
the resolution will mean that Systick generates interrupts more often, which in turn
leads to higher overhead as more time will be spent on processing these interrupts.
For example, if we want to have a 100 µs resolution, that means every 100 µs the
device will receive an hardware interrupt, halting the current program. Then it will
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process the interrupt (increasing our "time elapsed" counter) and return back to the
spot in the program it left, a process which will take some clock cycles.
Performance penalty compared to running Systick at 1 ms resolution depends
on the platform and the chosen Systick resolution, as shown in table below. Perfor-
mance penalty for using 1 µs resolution for F0 was not measured, as it would have
been unacceptably high in any case.
Performance penalty
Resolution F0 F4
1 ms Starting point Starting Point
100 µs 0.9% Negligible
10 µs 10.7% 1.8%
1 µs N/A 22.5%
Table 4: Performance penalty associated with using Systick with diﬀerent timing
resolutions; timing resolution chosen for measurements on each platform is shown
in bold
5.2 Cryptographic performance
The performance of the uECC library was evaluated by measuring the time required
for each task in the following sequence: First, a key-pair was generated, then the
private key from the pair was used to sign a hash, and the public key from the
key-pair was used to verify the signature created in previous step. The ﬁnal step
was to compress and then decompress the public key created in the ﬁrst step. The
sequence was run 100 times and average values were calculated from the results,
shown in Table 5.
Tests were run on both platforms. For F0, there are optimized mathematical
libraries written in assembler available in uECC and thus tests were run twice on F0:
once using assembler optimizations, once without them. No assembler optimizations
were available for F4.
For all other tests, F0 was set to use assembler optimized libraries as they sig-
niﬁcantly increase the performance of F0.
For each signature the Barrier has to verify, it ﬁrst needs to decompress the
public key and then to verify it. As per table 5, F4 takes 7 ms to decompress and
then 66 ms to verify, meaning F4 will spend 73 ms per signature doing cryptographic
calculations. For F0, using assembler optimizations, these values increase to 52 ms
and 450 ms respectively, and thus requiring 502 ms to verify each signature, almost
a seven-fold increase in time taken.
To complete the transaction, the Barrier has to verify N+1 signatures, where N
is the amount of certiﬁcates embedded in the service request, with N being minimum
of 1. For our normal use case of 4 certiﬁcates this means 5 signatures and in the
case using certiﬁcate chain reduction, 2 signatures.
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Operation F4 no assembler F0 assembler F0 no assembler
Key generation 59 ms 410 ms 630 ms
Sign 64 ms 430 ms 650 ms
Verify 66 ms 450 ms 690 ms
Decompression 7 ms 52 ms 81 ms
Generate and sign a receipt 65 ms 440 ms 650 ms
Table 5: Time taken by cryptographic operations using uECC
After the transaction is completed, the Barrier has to generate and sign a receipt
for the Client, a process which takes approximately 65 ms on F4 and 440 ms on F0.
Time required to calculate hashes depends on the length of the message portion
being parsed, as seen in the Table 6, with the certiﬁcate message portion taking
longest time. In Table 6, hash calculation is only considered for the service request
message portion, not for the complete service request with an embedded certiﬁcate
chain.
5.3 Message parsing and evaluation
Time required to parse the message portions depends on the type of the message
portion being parsed. As seen in Table 6, a certiﬁcate takes longer to parse than a
service request message portion, because the certiﬁcate is longer and also contains
more ﬁelds.
Operation F4 F0
Parse a certiﬁcate 0.10 ms 0.9 ms
Calculate hash for a certiﬁcate 0.43 ms 2.9 ms
Parse a service request 0.09 ms 0.7 ms
Calculate hash of a service request 0.38 ms 2.6 ms
Evaluate certiﬁcate chain of 1 certiﬁcate 0.05 ms 0.24 ms
Evaluate certiﬁcate chain of 10 certiﬁcates 0.07 ms N/A
Table 6: Parsing, hashing and evaluation performance
Time spent on evaluating the certiﬁcate chain depends on the chain length. For
F4 it takes 0.05 ms to evaluate certiﬁcate chain length of 1 and 0.07 ms for chain of
10. Because F0 has limited memory available, it was not implemented to support
certiﬁcate chain length of 10 and thus tests were only ran for 1 certiﬁcate, with F0
taking 0.24 ms to evaluate a single certiﬁcate.
5.4 Bluetooth Low Energy performance
The Bluetooth module is an independent module, so its performance can be tested
completely separately from the chosen embedded platforms.
It was evaluated from two diﬀerent perspectives: First, I was interested in how
long it would take for the Client to ﬁnd the Barrier and open communications with
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Operation Time required
From starting software to "paired" state 120 ms
From paired state to receiving ﬁrst packet from Barrier 230 ms
From starting software to receiving ﬁrst packet 350 ms
Table 7: Bluetooth LE connection operations and times required
it. The starting point for that is service discovery: how long does it take for the
Client to receive Advertisement sent by the Barrier. The second step is opening the
actual communications link and negotiating transmission rates etc.
As seen on Table 7, pairing/service discovery is quite a fast operation, taking
approximately 120 ms, but opening the link and receiving the ﬁrst message adds
around 230 ms, so it takes 350 ms to reach the point where the Client can start
sending the signed service request to the Barrier.
The second perspective was to evaluate the actual maximum transfer speeds,
which was done for both scenarios in our use case: sending a signed service request
with a certiﬁcate chain length of 4, or the Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction scenario
where the certiﬁcate chain length is 1.
With a certiﬁcate chain length of 4, the time required to receive all 3716 bytes of
payload was on average 870 ms, resulting in an eﬀective throughput of approximately
34 kpbs.
For a signed service request with a certiﬁcate chain length of 1, time required
to receive all 1442 bytes of payload was on average 330 ms, resulting in an eﬀective
throughput of approximately 35 kbps.
As stated in Section 4.3.4, delays had to be inserted to Bluetooth transmission
speeds on F0 so that message buﬀers would not overrun, but these artiﬁcial delays
do not represent the actual performance the BLE module is capable of, and therefore
are not taken into account here. The eﬀect on performance created by the delays is
negligible, because the F0 based system is not bandwidth bound.
5.5 Transaction performance
Previously I have measured both the time required to transmission the message and
the time required by the computational operations. However, transaction perfor-
mance cannot be calculated in a linear manner from the ﬁgures above, as computa-
tional operations are pipelined to be partially completed during message transmis-
sion. So transactional performance consists of three pieces which were measured:
the time elapsed between the Client sending a signed service request to the Barrier,
and the Barrier having completed evaluating the certiﬁcate chain, time required for
device discovery and ﬁnally the time required for opening a connection, negotiating
link speed etc., with last two taking on average 350 ms.
In the Table 8 I have collated the performance measurements for all four system
performance proﬁles, with two use cases, run on two platforms: Our standard use
case with certiﬁcate chain length of 4, and Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction use case
with certiﬁcate chain length of 1, both tested on F0 and F4 platforms.
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Operation type for time spent
F4, 1
certiﬁcate
F4, 4
certiﬁcates
F0, 1
certiﬁcate
F0, 4
certiﬁcates
Total time taken to complete trans-
action
760 ms 1300 ms 1700 ms 3200 ms
Bluetooth
Service discovery 120 ms 120 ms 120 ms 120 ms
Opening Connection 230 ms 230 ms 230 ms 230 ms
Time spent transferring information 330 ms 870 ms 330 ms 900 ms
Time spent delaying N/A N/A 30 ms 630 ms
Computation
Parsing and hashing 3 ms 5 ms 16 ms 40 ms
Decompress and verify 150 ms 370 ms 1000 ms 2530 ms
Combined
Bluetooth Only 610 ms 920 ms 610 ms 640 ms
Computational operations done dur-
ing Bluetooth transmit and delays
75 ms 300 ms 98 ms 1300 ms
Computational operations only 74 ms 74 ms 930 ms 1300 ms
Signed service request
Generate, sign and transmit 400 ms 400 ms 780 ms 780 ms
Table 8: Transaction performance
For F4, the transaction takes less than 1.5 seconds in the case with 4 certiﬁcates
and less than 1 second using Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction. For F0, the performance
is signiﬁcantly worse, taking 1.7 seconds to complete even the shorter transaction
with CRC applied and 3.2 seconds for the case with 4 certiﬁcates.
A transaction is considered complete, when the Barrier has made the decision
about granting access to the parking lot. After the transaction is complete, the
Barrier will generate, sign and send a signed receipt to the Client. This process is
heavily bandwidth bound, taking approximately 400 ms for the F4 and 780 ms for
the F0 because the current implementation is not optimized to pipeline signing to
take place while the message is being sent.
Receipt generation and sending does not have impact on user experience, as the
time required to open the gate and drive a car out of Bluetooth Low Energy range
is signiﬁcantly higher than 1 second.
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6 Analysis
In this section, I will present analysis, discussing each Research Question presented
in the Introduction (Section 1.3): Transaction performance (Research Question 2),
Task distribution (Research Question 2), Relative cost of computational tasks (Re-
search Question 3), Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction (Research Question 4) and Beneﬁts
of public key compression (Research Question 5).
I will also evaluate the performance of Bluetooth Low Energy and discuss the
security aspects of the system.
6.1 Research Question 1: Transaction performance
Research Question 1 was: how long will it take to complete the transaction and
how will our embedded platform choice aﬀect it? As seen in the ﬁgure 14, using
Figure 14: Transaction times by platform and certiﬁcate amount
F4 we were easily able to complete the whole transaction in less than 1.5 seconds
even when using 4 certiﬁcates and in less than 1 second when taking advantage of
Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction, so the system is deﬁnitely fast enough for our purposes
as deﬁned by our Business Requirement 6. Latency of less than one second should
be considered good even for cases where there is human interaction and the process
is not something repeated extremely often.
F0 almost meets our requirements when using Certiﬁcate Chain reduction, taking
1.7 seconds to complete the transaction. Unfortunately when using 4 certiﬁcates, the
transaction takes 3.2 seconds, leading to a very noticeable delay between starting and
completing transaction. I believe that using a certain optimizations which will be
discussed later in Chapter 7, it would be possible to complete the whole transaction
in slightly under 1.5 seconds.
In conclusion, I ﬁnd F4 a very suitable embedded platform for this application.
In cases with less strict time requirements, for example machine-to-machine interac-
tions without strict time limits, F0 would be fast enough, though its limited memory
might pose other challenges.
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6.2 Research Question 2: Task distribution
In this section, I analyze the task distribution during the transaction. As the system
performance proﬁles for F4 and F0 are diﬀerent, they will be analyzed separately.
6.2.1 F4
Timeline diagrams, Figures 15 and 16, show the distribution and timing for each
task on F4 platform (times to transfer each message portions are approximated).
It is evident from the diagrams that majority of the time is spent on Bluetooth
Low Energy activities. Purely computational operations that cannot be pipelined
account for less than 10% of the time budget in both cases, as seen on Figure 17.
As seen on Figures 15 and 16, the last message portion to be transmitted is
always the signature for the service request. Thus no matter how fast cryptographic
operations are calculated, this signature must always be veriﬁed after the Client-to-
Barrier Bluetooth transmission is complete.
Timeline: task distribution (F4, 1 certificate)
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Figure 15: Times spent on tasks in transaction. F4, 1 certiﬁcate
Bluetooth dominates the time budget for two reasons: ﬁrst, there is signiﬁcant
overhead (350 ms) in just establishing communications between Client and Barrier,
where no payload except Nonce and Barrier ID are transferred. But even if that
is discounted, the system still spends the majority of time just waiting for data
to arrive via BLE: at 3435 kbps, each message portion takes around 8090 ms to
transmit.
Considering that only half of the message portions are signatures that have to
be veriﬁed, it means that the Barrier spends around 170 ms waiting for a message
to arrive for each 74 ms the Barrier spends verifying the signatures: in other words,
bandwidth is a major bottleneck in our performance for F4 platform.
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Timeline: task distribution (F4, 4 certificates)
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Figure 16: Times spent on tasks in transaction. F4, 4 certiﬁcates
(a) 1 certiﬁcate (b) 4 certiﬁcates
Figure 17: Time distribution between Bluetooth and computational tasks for F4.
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6.2.2 F0
For F0, situation changes radically from F4. This is easy to see in the timeline
Figures 18 and 19, where it can be seen that F0 is unable to complete signature
veriﬁcation before receiving the next message. The large delays shown in Bluetooth
Low Energy transfers in Figure 19 had to be added to keep the Barrier's message
buﬀer from overﬂowing. Still, the inserted transfer delays only add 20 ms to the
time taken by the whole transaction, as now the system bottleneck has moved from
bandwidth to computational performance.
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C
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
a
l
B
lu
et
o
ot
h
Tr
an
sa
ct
io
n
120 ms
Locate 
barrier
230 ms
Open connection 
receive first ACK
360 ms
Send service request with 
embedded certificate chain 
(length 1)
~80 ms
Req
~90 ms
Certifica
te
~80 ms
Signatu
re 1
~80 ms
Signatu
re 2
4 ms
Parse
request
4 ms
Parse
certificate
510 ms
Parse, Decompress & Verify Signature 1
1 700 ms
Time taken from device discovery to the Barrier granting access
510 ms
Parse, Decompress & Verify Signature 2
Evaluate certificate chain
10 ms delays inserted after each message portion, F0 limitation
Figure 18: Times spent on tasks in transaction. F0, 1 certiﬁcate
Timeline: task distribution (F0, 4 certificates)
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Figure 19: Times spent on tasks in transaction. F0, 4 certiﬁcates
As seen on the pie graphs in Figure 20, Bluetooth drops from dominating the time
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use to being less than half for 1 certiﬁcate case. Pie chart b in Figure 20b is eﬀected
by the fact that the added delays move computational operations from "Computa-
tional operations only" to "Pipelined". If the delays were removed, "Computational
operations only" would increase to 57% and the time taken for the transmission
could be almost halved, but this would have only a minimal eﬀect on the actual
transaction performance.
For F0, the main bottleneck is computational performance, whereas for F4 it's
bandwidth.
(a) 1 certiﬁcate (b) 4 certiﬁcates
Figure 20: Time distribution between Bluetooth and computational tasks for F0.
6.2.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, while the actual tasks remain the same, distribution of used time is
dependent on the processing power of the embedded platform. For F4, the nRF8001
BLE chip is an obvious bottleneck in the system performance and if increased per-
formance is desired, increasing bandwidth is priority number one.
For slow embedded systems like F0, performance characteristics of the commu-
nication platform become less important, especially if Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction
is not used, as cryptographic operations dominate the time budget.
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6.3 Research Question 3: Computational tasks
The computational tasks the embedded system performs are parsing, evaluating
certiﬁcate chain, hashing, decompressing public keys and verifying signatures, with
last three being considered cryptographic operations in the scope of this work.
In most cases, time taken by these processes scales linearly with the number of
times each task has to be done. There are small diﬀerences, for example parsing and
hashing are dependent on the length of the message portion which means that those
tasks take longer to perform for a certiﬁcate than they do for a service request or
signature, but generally the time required for computational tasks scales on O(N),
where N equals 1 + certiﬁcate chain length.
The major exception to this is certiﬁcate chain evaluation: considering that
evaluating a certiﬁcate chain of length 10 takes less than twice the time required for
evaluating a certiﬁcate chain of length 1, O(N) scaling doesn't seem appropriate for
that operation. I did not ﬁnd the reason for this, but the most likely explanation is
some relatively high-cost operation that only needs to be done once per evaluation.
Figure 21: Computational time distribution for all platform/certiﬁcate combinations
I was interested in the time distribution of the diﬀerent computational tasks.
As seen on the Figure 21, from the performance viewpoint veriﬁcation and decom-
pression dominate computational operations. When one considers that hashing is
required in this system for veriﬁcation, of all computational operations those related
to cryptography take over 99% of resources, with parsing and evaluation taking less
than 0.5% of time.
So it can be said that from a computational performance viewpoint, only cryp-
tographic operations matter.
6.4 Research Question 4: Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction
Figure 14 shows that using Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction gives large performance
beneﬁts: Not considering the time taken by service discovery and opening Bluetooth
link, when using 4 to 1 Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction the time required to complete
a transaction drops by 55% and 51% on F4 and F0 respectively. When taking the
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whole transaction into account, the time reduction is reduced to 41% for F4 and
49% for F0, which is still a very signiﬁcant performance gain.
The reason why the reduction is smaller for F0 than it is for F4 is that ﬁxed time
costs of opening a Bluetooth link (350 ms) are a relatively much greater portion of
the transaction for F4 than they are for F0, 44% compared to 21%.
Chain Reduction doesn't just improve performance: it also allows embedded
devices to save energy, as the energy usage of a properly designed embedded system
is heavily dependent on the processor time required to perform tasks. Being able
to halve the amount of computation required by the embedded system will lead to
major energy savings. While energy savings are not as important in all contexts, for
battery powered devices, energy usage often is what makes or breaks a system.
For the following reasons, reducing the amount of certiﬁcates via Certiﬁcate
Chain Reduction does not increase performance in a linear fashion:
1. While the amount of verify operations required is a function of the number
of certiﬁcates in the certiﬁcate chain, a signed service request is also always
present. So the amount of operations required is N+1, where N is the amount
of certiﬁcates present in certiﬁcate chain. 4 to 1 reduction then reduces the
number of veriﬁcations required from 5 to 2, a 60% decrease.
2. As signature for the service request is always the ﬁnal message portion received,
so there is always one cryptographic operation that cannot be pipelined.
3. Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction does not reduce the amount of time required for
establishing communications.
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6.5 Research Question 5: Beneﬁts of public key compression
There is a trade-oﬀ in using compressed public keys, between the required bandwidth
and the time taken by decompressing required public keys. My hypothesis was that
the time saved by the decreased message length would more than compensate for the
extra eﬀort required to decompress public key. This hypothesis was only partially
correct, being true for F4 and false for F0.
Each service request and certiﬁcate message portion stores two public keys and
each signature message portion stores one public key, leading to each signed mes-
sage portion having three public keys. Because only the public key stored in the
signature portion has to be decompressed by the Barrier, 186 bytes (3 public keys,
each compressed public key being 31 bytes shorter than uncompressed one, using
hexadecimal encoding) are saved by using compression.
This means that when using compressed public keys with current maximum
bandwidth of 35 kbps, for each signature portion sent system gains 43 ms in saved
transmission time and spends either 7 ms (F4) or 52 ms (F0) doing decompression.
For F4, the using compressed public keys saves more than the 36 ms (43 ms - 7
ms) per signature sent, as the transaction is bandwidth bound, and for all pipelined
operations system is able to complete both public key decompression and signa-
ture veriﬁcation before next message portion has arrived (see Figures 15 and 16).
This means that F4 gets the beneﬁts for all signatures, but pays the "price" of de-
compression only once (for the ﬁnal signature that cannot be pipelined) as far as
performance is concerned.
Bandwidth (bps) Time saved (ms)
236 700 6.3
230 400 6.5
115 200 12.9
57 600 25.8
33 400 44.6
28 800 51.7
14 400 103.3
9 600 155.0
Table 9: Time saved by transferring three public keys in compressed format by
bandwidth
For F4, using compressed public keys saves approximately 79 ms of time (10%)
for the Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction Scenario and 208 ms (16%) for the 4 certiﬁcate
scenario.
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For F0, situation changes. With almost seven-fold reduction in processing speed,
using compressed certiﬁcates leads to slightly decreased transactional performance,
increasing time taken by 18 ms (∼0.5%) when using Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction
and 45 ms (∼1%) for the 4 certiﬁcate scenario. This performance penalty is marginal
and doesn't mean using compressed public keys for F0 is a poor choice: F0 has only
a limited amount of memory and storing public keys in uncompressed form would
require allocating over 30% more memory for the data structure storing message
portions, compared to using compressed public keys.
The breakpoint for using compressed public keys is calculated in Table 9: we
would need to increase our current achieved throughput by at least factor of 6
to 210 kbps for uncompressed public keys to have a performance advantage over
compressed ones (using F4).
Implementing a denser encoding would, of course, reduce time saved by using
compressed keys: for straight binary encoding numbers in table 9 should be halved,
leading to decreased absolute eﬀectiveness. Denser encoding could, on other hand,
also mean that the relative eﬀect of public key compression is increased as a larger
portion of the message would consist of public keys, because in current encoding
large portion of the message consists of verbose ﬁeld descriptions that could be
replaced with short codes.
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6.6 Bluetooth Low Energy performance
Though the theoretical maximum bandwidth of Bluetooth Low Energy is 236.7 kbps
[12], the actual maximum is much lower: each packet has a maximum of 20 bytes
of payload and a device could send or receive 6 such packets per minimum interval
of 7.5 ms, leading to a maximum throughput of 128 kpbs. Unfortunately, no such
device is currently available to function as the Client device: while Apple iOS devices
support using 6 packets per interval, the minimum interval Apple devices can use
for communicating with generic BLE devices is 20 ms [1] which leads to a maximum
throughput of 48 kbps.
Android devices, on the other hand, do support the minimum 7.5 interval de-
ﬁned in Bluetooth speciﬁcation [13]. Unfortunately they only support 4 packets per
interval at that speed, which leads to a theoretical maximum throughput of 85 kbps,
though in real life only speeds of 58 kbps have been achieved [12]. Unfortunately
the chosen BLE chipset (nRF8001) only supports receiving 2 packets and sending
one packet per interval at 7.5 ms, reducing the theoretical maximum throughput to
42.6 kbps. Testing shows that even said speed is not achievable, with 34-35 kbps
being a realistic maximum for this combination.
While these numbers are heavily dependent on the software Bluetooth Stack used
in the Client device, most likely other Android devices have similar performance.
Apple iOS devices on the other hand will have a lower maximum throughput using
nRF8001, 50% to 75% compared to Android.
Bluetooth Low Energy suﬀers a small, but measurable, drop when sending larger
payloads. The reason for this is unknown, but most likely related to the Android
Bluetooth stack: I found a bug in it where a small (1 ms) delay had to be used
before inserting next packet into BLE transfer queue or a non-deterministic packet
loss of 1-2% would occur on longer transmissions. This added delay was not evident
on the actual transmission side of the Bluetooth Stack though: the time taken to
insert packets into BLE transfer queue was less than 1/3 of the time required to
transmit the same BLE packets.
While our modular architecture should in theory be able to make both computa-
tional modules have same Bluetooth performance, the delays required by limitations
in F0 platform do change the performance proﬁles and because of this, F4 and F0
are discussed separately.
6.6.1 F4
As seen in the Figure 22, the time distribution of Bluetooth operations for F4 is quite
simple: a ﬁxed time to required to open a connection accounts for 30-50% of the
Bluetooth time budget. Changing to a BLE chip with higher bandwidth would not
result in a linear performance increase, and a more than 2x increase in bandwidth
would lead to diminishing returns as the system would become CPU bound.
Increasing the bandwidth to 2x would cut approximately 130 ms from the to-
tal transaction time when sending one certiﬁcate and 390 ms when sending four,
but after that the point of diminishing returns is reached. Further increasing the
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(a) 1 certiﬁcate (b) 4 certiﬁcates
Figure 22: Bluetooth time distribution for F4.
bandwidth to 4x would only result in savings of approximately 190 and 490 ms,
respectively.
The reason for the non-linear savings increase is the message structure of a signed
service request: the third message portion is the ﬁrst to require cryptographic veri-
ﬁcation. Before the third message portion is received, the system can beneﬁt from
all the increased bandwidth, but after said message portion has been received, any
bandwidth increases above approximately 2.2x will result in the system becoming
CPU bound.
6.6.2 F0
Unfortunately, the F0 limitations discussed earlier meant that artiﬁcial delays had
to be inserted to the Bluetooth Low Energy module. For the Certiﬁcate Chain
Reduction use case, delays are pretty marginal as is seen in the Figure 23, as sending
only 4 message portions means that only the last message portion has to be stored
in the circular buﬀer while the previous message portion is still being processed, (see
ﬁgure 18), but for the use case of 4 certiﬁcates, delays account for 34% of all the
time taken for Bluetooth.
Fortunately, these only aﬀect the time taken for actual transaction minimally as
described in Section 4.3.4.
Interestingly, even though we are forced to add delays to Bluetooth transfers,
increased bandwidth would still be useful from a performance point of view. While
the performance increase would not be as great as for F4, because of the signed
service request message structure explained in previous section, performance increase
would still be almost as large for the use case with one certiﬁcate, as it is for F4.
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(a) 1 certiﬁcate (b) 4 certiﬁcates
Figure 23: Bluetooth time distribution for F0.
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6.7 Security
There are three common attack vectors present for any system that transmits infor-
mation:
1. Passive Wiretapping, or eavesdropping, where an attacker can receive a copy
of private communications, thus compromising the conﬁdentiality of the infor-
mation.
2. Man-in-The-Middle (MITM), where an attacker can insert or alter messages
between the communicating parties, compromising both the conﬁdentiality
and integrity of the information.
3. Replay attacks, where an attacker eavesdrops secret information, and replays
that information to gain access to the resource.
All three vectors have been taken into account when designing the protocol, even
though Bluetooth Low Energy as a transmission channel is vulnerable to both eaves-
dropping and MITM-attacks[13] because session encryption keys are transmitted in
cleartext. These attacks are mitigated by two ways:
All messages are digitally signed and thus it is not possible to insert, remove or
modify any data sent between the Client and the Barrier without the other party
noticing it and discarding the message. This makes most MITM attacks ineﬀective.
Replay attacks are prevented by using a nonce, which will make the Barrier deny
all attempts to use the system by retransmitting eavesdropped message. Using a
nonce means that eavesdropping becomes a privacy issue instead of a security one.
While the system is still technically vulnerable to possibly leaking private infor-
mation, one must take into account that because Bluetooth Low Energy has such
a short range, all attacks require physical presence at the system location. At this
point, the attackers could probably get far more private information of the users
simply by setting up a video camera and using Optical Character Recognition to
read license plates.
It would also be possible to implement a separate layer of encryption, but the
performance penalties would most likely be severe, and I do not consider the trade-oﬀ
worth it in this case.
I chose not to sign Advertisement messages because it would signiﬁcantly increase
time required to complete a transaction, which could mean that spooﬁng a Barrier
would be possible. While spooﬁng does not open any new evident attack vectors, in
future it might be useful to give the Client the option to request a signature for the
advertisement or to send it automatically. While using scan response packet would
be ideal for this in all other respects, the problem is that scan response also has
only 31 bytes of payload which is insuﬃcient for any secure form of signature to be
transmitted.
The newly released Bluetooth 4.2 speciﬁcation has extensions for ﬁxing the se-
curity issues present in Bluetooth Low Energy, but as of yet there are no devices
implementing it.
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As the current system doesn't support limits or online checks, it is vulnerable
to certain types of misuses, unless they are addressed in some way. For example,
a driver could use the same certiﬁcate to park multiple cars at the parking lot or
a reseller might sell more parking places than there are free places available in the
parking area.
Handling of these issues is just as much a business decision as a technical one:
while it is possible, though extremely cumbersome, to add limits to the certiﬁcate
issued by the reseller, it is much easier to make a contract that stipulates how many
permits a reseller is allowed to sell.
Similarly, while it would easy to note which certiﬁcates are "in use" currently
at each parking area, synchronize the information to a server and then have the
Barrier check this before allowing a driver entry to the parking lot, from a business
perspective it would probably be better to just log the certiﬁcate use to a central
server that would check for concurrently used certiﬁcates once a day and send a bill
for any misuses. This also has the additional advantage of not requiring a constant
network connection.
F0 using a non-cryptographically secure pseudo-RNG to generate the random
number k for purposes of signing does present a problem: as stated in Section 2.2.1,
having non-random k leads to the possibility of the private key leaking. There are
many possible answers to this, ranging from implementing a proper deterministic
Random Number Generator as described in the document SP800-90A [3] to imple-
menting true RNG using General Purpose Input/Outputs as entropy sources in the
F0.
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7 Discussion
The objective of this work was to ﬁnd out if an access control system, using a
smartphone as the Client device and an embedded device for veriﬁcation, would be
fast enough for parking purposes.
F4 embedded platform system is able to process a service request with 4 certiﬁ-
cates in less than 1.5 seconds, and taking advantage of Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction
to reduce number of required certiﬁcates to 1 speeds up the transaction so that it
takes less than a second, exceeding our business requirements (Business Require-
ment 6).
To better understand the performance aspects, the system was also implemented
with F0 platform, which almost met our performance requirements when using Cer-
tiﬁcate Chain Reduction, taking 1.7 seconds to complete transaction.
So while the goal was attainable, there are certain hardware requirements and
cheapest microcontrollers will have diﬃculty fulﬁlling them. Another consideration
is that cheaper embedded platforms rarely have hardware Random Number Gener-
ators, and ECDSA signing is susceptible to leaking the private key if either number
gets re-used in multiple signings, or if the numbers can be guessed.
The advantage of using this system for access control, is that it requires relatively
little existing infrastructure: it can be installed easily wherever a low voltage line
can be installed. Being small, cheap and low on energy usage, it would be possible
to install one on every parking spot at a garage, instead of just installing one at the
entrance. Or installing one as an electronic lock in a normal door.
Another advantage is that it would be possible to give the end-users a right to
delegate access to the parking lot: for example, companies could give out very short-
term certiﬁcates for visitors. Same certiﬁcates could even be used to grant access to
open doors to the building.
From a hardware point of view the prototype was cheap, with cost of less than
100 euros including both embedded platforms. By using a diﬀerent BLE module and
integrating it directly to the embedded device, it would be easy to lower the hardware
costs below 30 euros. Further decreases might require custom circuit board design,
for which the initial costs are so high that selling thousands, or tens of thousands,
of units might be required to recoup them.
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8 Future work
In this section, I will concentrate on F4, simply because F0 is so slow that using
a separate hardware cryptographic processor would be required to accelerate its
performance to acceptable levels if Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction is not used.
While our system has low energy usage if connected to mains, its energy budget
is most likely too large for a battery powered system, though it would be useful to
evaluate this aspect of the system in detail.
8.1 Bandwidth and transmission times
Bandwidth being a major bottleneck in our system, it is also the ﬁrst place to
look for performance improvements. There are two relatively easy changes that
could be made to reduce transmission times: nRF8001, the BLE chipset used in the
prototype, only supports sending two messages per interval. Changing to a chipset
supporting four messages per interval could in theory double our throughput to
68-70 kbps, though research suggests that the realistic maximum is below 60 kbps
[12].
Currently, certiﬁcates are encoded as canonical S-expression (with advanced
transport extension), using only printable ASCII characters. This is very waste-
ful from a transmission point of view. For example, all numbers are encoded as
printable hexadecimal numbers, meaning that the system has to send 64 bytes to
transmit 32 bytes of information.
Considering this and the fact that the ﬁeld descriptions can be over 20 bytes
long, changing to binary or partially binary encoding would easily allow halving the
message size. This would eﬀectively double our perceived bandwidth (halving the
time required to receive signed service request).
Implementing these changes could almost quadruple transmission performance,
changing the bottleneck to be CPU again. Doubling perceived bandwidth should
reduce transaction time on F4 to approximately 860 ms when receiving 4 certiﬁ-
cates, and 590 ms when using Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction, reductions of 33% and
22% respectively. Quadrupling perceived bandwidth leads to diminishing returns,
reducing transaction times on F4 to approximately 640 ms in the 4 certiﬁcate use
case and to 510 ms when receiving 1 certiﬁcate.
According to our previous analysis in Table 9, it would still be beneﬁcial to use
compressed keys for F4 even if perceived bandwidth is quadrupled, but for slower
microcontrollers it does mean that moving to uncompressed keys at that point would
lead to performance improvements.
8.2 Embedded platform
Cryptographic performance could be increased in at least two diﬀerent ways: ﬁrstly,
uECC, the cryptographic library used, includes optimized mathematical function
libraries written in assembler for Cortex M0 processors and using them eﬀectively
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increases the performance by half. Porting those libraries to work with Cortex M4
would probably give similar performance enhancements.
These assembler optimizations could also allow us to consider using cheaper and
slower platforms for applications. With assembler optimizations it should be possible
to use a cheaper Cortex M4 platform than our F4 and still achieve performance
similar to F4. While the F0, 48 MHz Cortex M0, was almost acceptable for the
purposes of this work, it could be adequate for many other tasks where slow latency
does not detract from user experience.
Another way to use cheaper embedded platforms would be to ooad Elliptic
Curve Cryptography to dedicated hardware. This could reduce both the time and
energy required to perform cryptographic operations by multiple magnitudes.
The limited amount of RAM in F0, or other cheap platforms, might pose a prob-
lem for applications built on that platform: I was already forced to reduce both the
maximum allowed certiﬁcate chain length and circular buﬀer size to get it to work in
our proof-of-concept program: it is possible that memory required for implementing
a complete system might require dropping the circular buﬀer altogether, resulting
in a signiﬁcant performance penalty as pipelining is disabled. Memory requirements
might even make implementation impossible for F0.
While storing certiﬁcates or message buﬀer in the RAM of the embedded device
is not required, other options would most likely either result in a relatively large
performance penalty or would be more expensive to implement than just using a
more capable embedded platform.
8.3 Caching certiﬁcates
Another way to increase performance would be to cache commonly used certiﬁcates,
by adding hashes of veriﬁed certiﬁcates to a data structure, and before verifying
certiﬁcate, checking if the hash is present in the cache and skipping the signature
veriﬁcation step accordingly.
Storing the certiﬁcate validity ﬁeld in the cache is not required (as the certiﬁcate
will be evaluated as part of the chain), and would increase the size of the cache
structure by large margin, but for caching purposes it would be useful to have a
mechanism that would evaluate the validity of a certiﬁcate in cache. For example,
the Barrier could do a validity check on a certiﬁcate before checking if said certiﬁcate
is present in the cache. If the validity check for the certiﬁcate fails, the cache would
be purged of that certiﬁcate. At this point the Barrier could immediately send the
client a NACK, informing that a certiﬁcate is not valid anymore.
The main problem with the this caching approach is that it isn't really eﬀective
in increasing the performance of the system, unless the system is CPU bound and
has ample memory. In cases where the system is bandwidth bound, like the current
F4 implementation, there is no performance advantage for using this caching mecha-
nism. It could be very useful for CPU bound systems like F0, but those usually lack
the spare memory required for the caching mechanism to work, and adding external
memory is very likely more expensive than changing to a faster microcontroller.
For bandwidth bound systems, a more complex caching system would have to be
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implemented. One possible example would be a system where the Client presents
hashes of the certiﬁcates it possesses to the Barrier, and the Barrier replies which of
those certiﬁcates it doesn't require signature for, and having Client only transmit the
certiﬁcates without signatures. Of course, if the Barrier would implement complete
caching of certiﬁcates, the process could be made even faster.
When considering energy usage, a caching mechanism gives signiﬁcant beneﬁts.
With the power usage of the embedded portion correlating almost one-to-one with
processor time, any mechanism that will allow the system to sleep instead of churning
processor cycles on expensive cryptographic operations will save a signiﬁcant amount
of energy. Even if the cache is large, accessing it is still basically free compared to
the price of doing veriﬁcation.
How eﬀective the cache is depends on what environment the system is installed
on. A good assumption for parking, especially if the parking places are rented on a
monthly basis, is that most users will be regulars, meaning the certiﬁcates they use
will only be veriﬁed once against the signature and then multiple times from the
cache. Similarly, the number of users will most likely not be huge, which is good
as the system can only store a limited amount of certiﬁcate hashes in the cache,
though for F4 "limited" could mean a few thousands.
In summary, when the goal is to save energy, caching is always useful, but to
gain performance improvements, the transmission protocol needs to take caching
into account. Internal reductions are eﬀectively a caching mechanism in all but
name, and the main disadvantage of caching certiﬁcates is that it requires enough
memory to store cached data for a large portion of the users.
8.4 Logging and network
For a commercial system, some sort of network connection would be desirable in
future. It would be possible to create a system where a smartphone Internet con-
nection is used for transferring data: having the Barrier transfer payload data to the
Client and then having the Client transfer it to a server via Internet the next time
it has an Internet connection. This is of course a quite complex setup with many
possible problems, but it would enable creating a Barrier entirely without a wired
network.
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9 Summary
This thesis presents a prototype implementation of an SPKI Authorization certiﬁcate
based access control system that would support distributed non-networked systems.
My main goal was to ﬁrst explore the feasibility of the solution and then, having
found it feasible, evaluate the performance of such system.
The faster embedded platform was surprisingly fast, being able to verify a 256-
bit Elliptic Curve cryptographic signature in less than 70 ms. This speed enables
our system to perform a full access control transaction in less than one second using
Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction and in under 1.5 seconds without, which is excellent
performance for our parking application.
The Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction mechanism presented in SPKI oﬀers major
beneﬁts, increasing the eﬀective performance of the system by 70 to 95 percent.
One large advantage the Certiﬁcate Chain Reduction oﬀers is that it works equally
well for both CPU and bandwidth bound systems, as it reduces resource usage from
both in similar amounts.
Public key compression was found to give a signiﬁcant beneﬁt when the system
is bandwidth bound, but for F0, which is CPU bound, it gave a marginal penalty.
Using compressed public keys also requires 25% less memory to store certiﬁcates in
the internal data structures, allowing longer chains to be used.
Bluetooth Low Energy was found to be more than adequate for the purposes of
this system. While the device discovery in Bluetooth Low Energy was very fast,
Bluetooth Low Energy throughput was found to be surprisingly low. This was
partially because of the chosen Bluetooth Low Energy chip (nRF8001,) but the
faster embedded platform would have been bandwidth bound even using a faster
Bluetooth Low Energy chip.
While Bluetooth Low Energy communications are vulnerable to both eavesdrop-
ping and Man-In-The-Middle attacks, these are not security issues in this system,
as all relevant communications are cryptographically signed and replay attacks are
prevented via the use of a nonce.
The system was implemented without network connection and the delegation
makes it possible to generate new certiﬁcates for the system without the original
issuer of the certiﬁcate. For logging purposes, intermittent network connection would
be useful, but it would be possible to transfer logging information using the Client
device.
Our Proof-of-Concept system was cheap, the hardware required for the imple-
mentation cost less than 100 euros (excluding the Client device). At the time of
writing, it would be possible to implement it with hardware costing less than 30
euros.
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A Service request and authorization certiﬁcate spec-
iﬁcations for the parking use case
This appendix presents the speciﬁcation for the service requests, authorization cer-
tiﬁcates and signatures for the use case of parking.
For each type, there is an example presented on how they can be broken down
into their component S-expressions, and how those can then be further broken into
subcomponent S-expressions.
Notations: If an S-expression is optional, is is marked by either ? or *: ? means
0-1, * means 0 or more. All numbers inside # tags are in hexadecimal notation
Certiﬁcate A Certiﬁcate object consists of the following S-expressions, coded in
the canonical form: issuer, subject, delegation right (=propagate), access rights
(=tag) and validity. A signed certiﬁcate consists of <cert> followed by
<signature>
<cert> = <issuer><subject><delegation><tag><validity>
Below is shown how the certiﬁcate object can be broken down into its compo-
nents.
<cert> = (11:certificate<issuer><subject><delegation>?<tag><validity>)
<issuer> = (6:issuer<principal>)
<principal> = <pub-key> = (10:public-key<pub-sig-alg-id><key>)
<pub-sig-alg-id> = (23:ecdsa-secp256k1-sha-256)
<key> = (#<public key value in compressed form>#)
<subject> = (7:subject<principal>)
<principal> = <pub-key> = (10:public-key<pub-sig-alg-id><key>)
<pub-sig-alg-id> = (23:ecdsa-secp256k1-sha-256)
<key> = (#<public key value in compressed form>#)
<delegation> = (9:propagate)
<delegation> ﬁeld is optional and if not present, certiﬁcate does not allow del-
egation
<tag> = (3:tag<tag-expr>)
<tag-expr> is completely domain speciﬁc: in our use case, it is following:
<tag-expr> = (4:park<permit>*)
Note:there can be multiple permits
<permit> = (5:permit<ID><permission>)
<ID> = (#<parking lot ID>#)
8 byte ID of the parking lot in hexadeximal (32-bit)
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<permission> = (#<permission type>#)
Permission type is coded as 2-byte bitﬁeld, with ﬁrst byte specifying permit
value for weekdays and second for weekends. Setting bit 1 allows parking
at the speciﬁed time, setting bit 0 disallows it
bit 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
time 0-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-16 16-17 17-18 18-24
<validity> = (5:valid<not-before>?<not-after><online-test>?)
<not-before> = (10:not-before<date>)
<date> = (19:YYYY-MM-DD_hh:mm:ss)
Optional
<not-after> = (9:not-after<date>)
<date> = (19:YYYY-MM-DD_hh:mm:ss)
Mandatory in this implementation
<online-test>
Online test consists of URL and public key
It is not used in this implementation
Service request
A signed Service request consist of the following S-expression: <service request>
followed by <signature>. A service request consists of the following S-expression:
<service request> = <request><issuer><nonce><validity><auth-chain>
Which can be broken down further:
<service request> = (15:service-request<request><issuer><nonce><validity><auth-chain>)
<request> = (9:parking-at<ID><principal>)
<ID> = (4:area(#<parking lot ID>#))
8 byte ID of the parking lot in hexadeximal (32-bit)
<principal> = <pub-key> = (10:public-key<pub-sig-alg-id><key>)
<pub-sig-alg-id> = (23:ecdsa-secp256k1-sha-256)
<key> = (#<public key value in compressed form>#)
<issuer> = (6:issuer<principal>)
<principal> = <pub-key> = (10:public-key<pub-sig-alg-id><key>)
<pub-sig-alg-id> = (23:ecdsa-secp256k1-sha-256)
<key> = (#<public key value in compressed form>#)
<nonce> = (5:nonce<nonce-value>)
<nonce-value> = (#<hexadecimal value for>#)
Nonce value proving that this is correctly formed request
<validity> = (5:valid<not-after>?)
<not-after> = (9:not-after<date>)
<date> = (19:YYYY-MM-DD_hh:mm:ss)
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Optional as nonce should be suﬃcient protection, but should be present
<auth-chain> = (10:auth-chain<length><signed cert>*)
<auth-chain> is also a S-expression speciﬁc to this implementation
<length> = (#<length of chain>#)
hexadecimal, 2 characters (0-255)
Minimum of 1, maximum length is implementation speciﬁc
Tells how many signed cert nodes there are in the auth chain
<signed cert> = <certificate><signature>
Mandatory: at least one, no more than <length>
Signature Certiﬁcate,service request and receipt also needs to be signed, but
signature is not part of those message portions themselves. Signature consists of
the following S-expression:
<signature> = <hash><principal><sig-val>
<signature> = (9:signature<hash><principal><sig-val>)
<hash> =(4:hash<hash-alg-name><hash-value>)
<hash-alg-name> = (7:SHA-256)
<hash-value> = (#<SHA-256 hash in hex>#)
Hash is calculated from the certiﬁcate/service request object (deﬁned
previously) and is 64 bytes long in string/hexadecimal form
<principal> = <pub-key> = (10:public-key<pub-sig-alg-id><key>)
<pub-sig-alg-id> = (23:ecdsa-secp256k1-sha-256)
<key> = (#<public key value in compressed form>#)
<sig-val> = (3:sig<sig>)
<sig> = (#<signed hash>#)
The signed hash is the actual signature calculated using ECDSA
Receipt A signed receipt consist of the following S-expression: <receipt> followed
by <signature>.
<receipt> = <request reply><reason>
<receipt> = (7:receipt<request reply><reason>)
<request reply> = (13:request-reply<hash-value>)
<hash-value> = (#<SHA-256 hash in hex>#)
Hash is calculated from the service request object (deﬁned
previously) and is 64 bytes long in string/hexadecimal form
<reason> = (6:reason(#<reason code in hex>#))
Reason codes are deﬁned in the paper "A Revocation, Validation and
Authentication Protocol for SPKI Based Delegation Systems"[21].
63
B Example of a signed certiﬁcate
This appendix presents an example of a certiﬁcate used in our use case. The certiﬁ-
cate has been formatted so that it is easier for readers to parse: actual certiﬁcates
do not have white spaces in them.
This certiﬁcate gives the subject the right to park at parking area 02, on weekdays
between 00.00 - 18.00 (fe) and on weekends between 00.00- 17.00 and 18.00-24.00
(fd) and the certiﬁcate expires on the end of year 2015.
(11:certificate
(6:issuer
(10:public-key
(23:ecdsa-secp256k1-sha-256)
(#032db1ae60c8953545dcf404160c82723
ce94b121d3c377e64d0abea87766437d9#)
)
)
(7:subject
(10:public-key
(23:ecdsa-secp256k1-sha-256)
(#03531e6c2be3ea0ff135b38ba9fcd0616
d8affce93be131bda568b1d18e286b95d#)
)
)
(9:propagate)
(3:tag
(4:park
(5:permit
(#00000002#)
(#fefd#)
)
)
)
(5:valid
(10:not-before
(19:1970-01-01_00:00:01)
)
(9:not-after
(19:2015-12-31_23:59:59)
)
)
)
The signed certiﬁcate continues on the next page.
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(9:signature
(4:hash
(7:SHA-256)
(#a99dcc8bba4062e937f2cb716253db091
a113c39ffa9e2ab8759a3f85df41698#)
)
(10:public-key
(23:ecdsa-secp256k1-sha-256)
(#032db1ae60c8953545dcf404160c82723
ce94b121d3c377e64d0abea87766437d9#)
)
(3:sig
(#64272723bbf1c38e48af3456dd5491d0e
192f278ac0e7aad485bebd1ae5a9ee9230f
aa61cb08131f54610d2ae08a79019c3d9c7
4944ab342015853a15351ca9d#)
)
)
